What does Putin do next? Welcome to The i Paper’s opinion series in which our writers and experts take a deeper look at the future for the Russian leader. • Putin is getting more desperate. It won’t end well• Furious Putin is trapped in a gilded cage. Only death will free him• Putin and Xi’s bromance could fall apart – and it’s all down to Trump• I’m an Eastern European – I know what Putin plans for my country• Putin has made a vast strategic error. This relationship shows us why• Putin’s fortress Russia has one weakness: The enemy within

What does Putin do next? Welcome to The i Paper’s opinion series in which our writers and experts take a deeper look at the future for the Russian leader.

• Putin is getting more desperate. It won’t end well• Furious Putin is trapped in a gilded cage. Only death will free him• Putin and Xi’s bromance could fall apart – and it’s all down to Trump• I’m an Eastern European – I know what Putin plans for my country• Putin has made a vast strategic error. This relationship shows us why• Putin’s fortress Russia has one weakness: The enemy within

Before Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on 24 February, 2022, few would have predicted that North Korea, a nation that seems stuck rigidly in the past, could become a key participant in a modern war. Four years later, we know better.

During this time, the hermit kingdom of North Korea has behaved in ways that hardly befit its long-standing nickname. Thus far, Pyongyang has sent 12 million rounds of artillery, coupled with at least 100 ballistic missiles, to Russia. Nearly 15,000 troops have been deployed, primarily to the Kursk region of Ukraine, together with thousands of construction workers, deminers and engineers.

Most of the troops dispatched in the autumn of 2024, in the first deployment of circa 11,000, were from the country’s élite special forces (the Storm Corps) and the Reconnaissance General Bureau. The latter is North Korea’s intelligence agency responsible for clandestine operations at home and abroad, akin to (though not quite the same as) the Soviet Union’s KGB during the Cold War

The Ukraine war has been the first modern global war in which North Korean troops have fought since the inconclusive Korean War from 1950 to 1953. Initial reports highlighted how North Korean soldiers struggled to adapt to hybrid and drone warfare and work effectively with their Russian counterparts. But since, Pyongyang’s contributions have been significant.

It was no surprise when, last April, Moscow and Pyongyang admitted for the first time that North Korean forces had been aiding Russia’s fight. The combined forces had secured a “precious victory” in the western Kursk region, “shedding blood and fighting in the same trench shoulder to shoulder” and “liberating” the region from “Ukrainian neo-Nazi forces”. When North Korea and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty on 19 June, 2024, it was quickly clear that this treaty would be worth more than just a piece of paper.

It committed both sides to mutual defence but also cooperation in sectors beyond security (economic, technological, and artificial intelligence). It was only a matter of time before Russia admitted – for the first time since the renewed rapprochement with North Korea – in early 2025 that its relationship with North Korea was an “alliance”. When Putin met Kim Jong Un at Beijing’s Victory Day celebrations on 3 September, 2025, the Russian leader’s words evinced this upgraded relationship, when he made clear how Russia would “never forget the sacrifices that your armed forces and the families of your servicemen have suffered”. Soon afterwards, Kim Jong Un would reciprocate in kind, promising that Pyongyang would do “everything we can to assist” Moscow’s war. This is hardly a mere geopolitical flirtation.

Three questions remain. Firstly, beyond two Russian-made Aurus limousines, what has Kim Jong Un been procuring from Vladimir Putin? Second, how does China, a core economic benefactor for both North Korea and Russia, see the Putin-Kim relationship? Third, in the event of the end of the Ukraine war, whether by Trumpian deal or precarious ceasefire, will the mutual olive branches between the two authoritarian despots be severed?

As Putin’s ties with Kim Jong Un warmed following the first year of the Ukraine war, Moscow gave Pyongyang humanitarian assistance, food, cash and, subsequently, oil. With North Korea’s economy in a paltry state following its self-enforced coronavirus-induced border closure, taking advantage of these benefits was a no-brainer for the Kim regime. Gaining over a million barrels of oil from Russia, for instance, allowed North Korea to free up financial resources. With less need to go through costly oil smuggling networks involving third-parties, Pyongyang could devote more money to its missile and nuclear development. Yet, after North Korea demonstrated how it was going “all in” through supplying Russia with troops, the possibility that the Kim regime was procuring its much-needed missile and military technology became increasingly likely.

Predictably, few details have been revealed, but the likelihood that North Korea has got itself drone and electronic warfare tech, anti-air defence systems and air-to-air missile tech from Russia is high. Irrespective of how much Russia values its artillery- and troop-supplier, Moscow looks unlikely to give Pyongyang its best military technology. For North Korea, however, second-best is far superior to its extant arsenal of Soviet-legacy systems. It is no surprise that in the opening ceremony of North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress last month, Kim Jong Un highlighted how his country’s economy was faring far better than in 2021, having overcome the “barbaric blockade” of international sanctions by “creating favourable conditions” in its foreign policy realm. It was a not-so-subtle nod to the country’s ties with Russia.

Beijing’s discomfort at the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance remains just that: discomfort. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s repeated invocations that China is neither interested nor willing to interfere in the ties between its two neighbours obfuscate a disturbing truth. For all of China’s supposed unease at Pyongyang’s short-term prioritisation of Moscow over Beijing, China continues to supply dual-use technologies to enable Russia’s war all the while continuing to abet North Korea’s sanctions evasion. Making matters worse is that China’s tolerance for a nuclear-armed North Korean neighbour – which it has long disliked – only continues to increase. Beijing and Moscow do not trust each other completely, but the mutually-declared “no-limits partnership” underscores both states’ alignment in opposing the US-led international order.

Where do we go from here? Any end to the Ukraine War is unlikely to see Putin abandon Kim Jong Un completely. Yes, Russia is opportunistic. And of course, relations with China and the United States, not least President Trump, are far more consequential than ties with North Korea. At the same time, North Korea’s losses of soldiers (dead and wounded) amounting to the thousands, have been acknowledged by Kim Jong Un, even if Pyongyang’s own admissions of the numbers remain inaccurate.

Whatever the outcome of the war, Russia’s ties with North Korea look unlikely to undergo a repetition of 1991, when Russia abandoned North Korea after the Soviet Union’s collapse. If a victorious Putin seeks more North Korean soldiers to assist in any future expansionist endeavours or serve as peacekeepers in Russian-occupied territory, then Kim Jong Un is unlikely to say no, irrespective of the likelihood of further casualties. Kim has already been inspecting a memorial due to be erected in Pyongyang to honour fallen soldiers killed whilst fighting for Russia.

In the event that the Ukraine War does not end in Russia’s favour, the opportunistic Putin could use Moscow’s ally of old to strengthen his challenge against the United States. Although Russia may no longer need North Korean missiles or manpower in any such situation, keeping North Korea on side will allow Moscow to continue undermining the international sanctions regime that both countries detest.

But it will take a long time for Putin to forget that that in a moment of desperation for artillery and more, it was, in fact, Kim Jong Un and his hermit kingdom of North Korea that came to his rescue.

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