Precise strikes on Iranian leadership targets by the US and Israel, launched at the very outset of the conflict, did not produce the expected collapse in Iran’s will or ability to fight. Iran has relied on the core logic of asymmetric warfare while also showing tactical innovation in sustaining retaliation against a stronger adversary.

In the current contest between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, it can be safely assumed that most asymmetries are stacked against Iran. Yet, Iran has maintained a display of stiff resistance and landed a few punches above its weight against its mighty opponents.

The US Department of State defines asymmetric warfare as

warfare in which belligerents are mismatched in their military capabilities or their accustomed methods of engagement. In such a situation, the militarily disadvantaged power must press its special advantages or effectively exploit its enemy’s particular weaknesses if the disadvantaged power is to have any hope of prevailing.1

warfare in which belligerents are mismatched in their military capabilities or their accustomed methods of engagement. In such a situation, the militarily disadvantaged power must press its special advantages or effectively exploit its enemy’s particular weaknesses if the disadvantaged power is to have any hope of prevailing.1

A weaker state’s first objective in war is regime survival, along with the preservation of core military assets and continuity of command. In Iran’s case, the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei after Ali Khamenei’s death underlines that regime survival remains the highest priority. Second, Iran cannot hope to defeat the US and Israel in a conventional military contest. Its aim, instead, is to deny the stronger side the achievement of its declared political and strategic objectives.

Third, the weaker side seeks to make the war militarily costly, politically unpopular, and economically disruptive for its adversaries. Fourth, in such an unequal contest, survival itself becomes a form of resistance and can be projected domestically and internationally as victory.  Fifth, Iran’s strategy is to stretch time. A weaker actor often prefers a longer war if prolongation can erode the stronger side’s public support, deepen political divisions, and increase international pressure for restraint. This paper aims to dissect Iran’s actions in line with these guidelines and examine how successful it has been at this stage of the contest.

Fighting on Home Turf

Iran is largely a plateau outlined by mountain ranges to the North and West and interspersed with two deserts to the North and East. The mountains protect the plateau, and the deserts slow any land-based invasion. Historically, Iran has relied on its size and difficult terrain to adopt a strategic defensive mindset. The deserts make approaching the heartland of Iran a logistical nightmare, while the high mountains offer natural high ground, making the terrain a defender’s delight. Iran dominates the waterway from the Persian Gulf to the Sea via the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. Such a location provides Iran with a unique strategic position of influencing the only waterway through which 20 per cent of the world’s energy flows.

Iran also provides the only alternative land route to the standard route via the Suez Canal, connecting regions of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. This allows Iran to exert a unique influence over the region and assert itself as a regional power.[ii] Iran has long attempted to activate a land bridge to the Western Mediterranean Sea via Shia strongholds of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to reach the ‘rear’ of Israel.[iii] In the current war, if attacks on Israel are launched from this region, it will confirm the success of such attempts and present a unique example of ‘turning the defences’ by attacking Israel from areas in depth.

Ensuring Reliability of Critical Capabilities

The mainstay of Iran’s arsenal is an array of low-cost drones, including the Shahed-131, Shahed-136, Shahed-129, Shahed-191, and the Mohajer family of drones. Various reports indicate that Shahed drones employed in Ukraine had a very high percentage of foreign/western-manufactured components. Despite sanctions, Iran has managed to continue sourcing components and manufacturing a large number of these low-cost drones. They have spread out their sources to avoid detection and maintain redundancy.

Figure 1: Iran’s Geography

Source: Bob Stanley Gardner, “Why Iran’s Geography Shapes Its Power”, Mapping Around

Presently, Russia has a dedicated manufacturing facility for the licensed production of the Russian version, Geran-2, which can be made available to the Iranians with little effort and in considerable numbers. This would amount to reciprocation for the help Iran provided through these drones when Russia was looking for an effective response to Ukraine’s drone capabilities. Targeting a drone costing a few thousand dollars with expensive missiles has imposed a unique asymmetric cost on the US-Israeli combine. Low cost has also permitted Iran to outnumber the interceptor missiles, causing serious concerns for planners in the US-Israel combine regarding the manufacture and replacement of the interceptor missiles at the rate at which they are being expended.

Over the last two decades, Iran has also spent considerable efforts in developing a strong lineup of ballistic missiles.[iv] The indigenous component of Iranian missiles is believed to be as high as 90 per cent. The beginnings were humble in the form of replicating Russian Scud and North Korean Nodong missiles. However, dedicated expertise and experience have........

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