Israel’s concerns towards close Syria-Türkiye ties reflect intensifying competition over the regional balance of power, the configuration of the new Syrian state and the boundaries of military and security influence. For Türkiye, Syria is a critical component of its national security framework encompassing state stability, border control, preventing armed groups’ resurgence, resolving the Kurdish issue and facilitating the return of Syrian refugees. Türkiye has emerged as the primary partner of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government in rebuilding state institutions and facilitating restructuring, commando training, military academy-building, weapons supply and integrating Syrian forces, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), into the national army.[1]

Israel’s threat perception has expanded beyond Iran to encompass Türkiye, viewing it as a strategic adversary, amid growing tensions with Ankara and its expanding regional influence. Following Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack and Israel’s war in Gaza, Türkiye has adopted an increasingly critical stance towards Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, leading to deterioration of political and trade ties between both states.[2] Israel has interpreted the Erdogan government’s close ties with Hamas, including Türkiye’s hosting of several key figures and supply of arms and finances, as indicative of Ankara’s regional strategy and antagonism towards the Jewish state.[3]

In this context, Israel views Türkiye’s military deployment and air defence infrastructure, including the SIPER system, as potentially altering the strategic equation, placing Turkish armed forces closer to Israel’s borders; limiting IDF’s operational freedom in Syrian airspace and territory and enabling Ankara to shape the military balance across southern and central Syria.[4] From Israel’s perspective, preserving freedom of action in Syria is essential, given Israeli mistrust of the Al-Sharaa government’s extremist links, to counter hostile armed actors including Hamas and Hezbollah and to sustain access for Israeli Air Force operations against Iran. Israel is concerned that Turkish air-defence systems could impede such operations.[5] During negotiations, Israel insists that any emerging security arrangement should include clear limits on foreign military deployments, particularly Turkish combat aircraft, air-defence systems and permanent bases.[6]

Israel’s limited strike on 18 August 2026 should be viewed as a tactical warning conveying the IDF’s readiness to use force to prevent Syria’s military development that could deepen Türkiye’s foothold within Israel’s strategic sphere.[7] The IDF therefore seeks to constrain Syria’s military reconstruction, signalling to Damascus that state-rebuilding and security arrangements remain subject to Israeli consent.[8] Ankara, through its engagement with Damascus, seeks to support state and institutional stability under Al-Sharaa, secure its southern border and maintain strategic posturing against Israel, whose military activities in neighbouring states, particularly Syria and Lebanon, pose a national security concern for Türkiye. [9]

Syria’s Quest for Advanced Weapons Systems

Following Bashar al-Assad’s ouster on 8 December 2024, the IDF launched hundreds of airstrikes inside Syrian territory, destroying 80 per cent of Syria’s heavy weapons, radar sites, and air-defence systems to prevent these facilities from reaching the new government under Al-Sharaa. Türkiye’s engagement aligns with Damascus’ objectives to re-develop military and security capabilities and determine its partnerships based on national interests and threat perceptions. Damascus views the restoration of its military capabilities as both a sovereign right and an existential security imperative to counter Islamic State (IS) cells, cross-border smuggling and terror networks, former regime remnants, armed militias, and Iran-backed allied groups.[10]

Syria has argued that building a functioning military, rehabilitating military bases, and restoring control over the state’s borders and airspace are essential conditions for stabilisation, consolidating governance and deterring fragmentation, rather than an attempt to challenge Israel. Accordingly, Syria has accelerated military reconstruction by integrating militias into a unified force, rebuilding its air force through recruitment and training of new pilots with Turkish support and participating in international military exercises in Türkiye in May 2026.[11]

Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani, while denying a Turkish military build-up, characterised the visits and exchanges as part of ongoing military cooperation between allies. Although Türkiye remains Syria’s dominant military partner, Damascus seeks to avoid long-term strategic dependence on Ankara by........

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