Nuclear issues are gaining more traction as part of BRICS Summit diplomacy. BRICS is a formidable grouping. It represents close to 50 per cent of the global population, includes the world’s largest emerging economies, and accounts for 40 per cent of global GDP and 26 per cent of global trade. The eleven member countries do carry sufficient political clout in the international order. BRICS even represents a prominent membership and leadership from the Global South.

If viewed through a nuclear lens, it comprises three nuclear-weapon states, two of which are P5 members. The third one aspires to be and makes a strong case for the same. Ten out of eleven BRICS member states are parties to the NPT, either in the form of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) or Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)—the treaty being the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and, by extension, the global nuclear order. The remaining exception is India: a non-party to the NPT, and with its ‘nuclear exceptionalism’, it has become a significant player in the global nuclear order.

Five of the eleven member states of BRICS are parties to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), namely Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia.  As of 2026, two BRICS countries are parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—South Africa and Indonesia. Brazil is a signatory but has not ratified the TPNW. In addition, nine of the eleven BRICS members are also formal members of the Conference on Disarmament.

Despite divergences among State positions, BRICS has the potential to become a strong nuclear minilateral. By its own admission, the BRICS ‘cooperation’ agenda has expanded considerably from its initial focus on economic issues of mutual concern. Over the course of 20 years, BRICS has absorbed the goal of building collective synergies on addressing........

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