The SaaS debt trap
Last week the debate was whether the AI industry was about to slow down. Anthropic’s Dario Amodei called for the industry to pace itself for safety reasons, semis sold off, the Journal ran a piece on whether an AI slowdown would break the market, and everyone with a microphone weighed in on the data-center bubble. Steve Rosenbush at the WSJ CIO Journal quoted me on the frontier-lag question that same week: “Most of them are not using the end of the frontier. A version from two years ago would be perfectly fine. There are audiences that barely can prompt. So a delay wouldn’t make a big difference.” I made the broader case in Bubble Talk Is How You Spot Someone Who Missed AI that the US buildout is a business, not a bubble. That argument was correct then and correct now. It was also the wrong debate.
The bubble nobody is looking at has more legs than the one everyone is arguing about. It is the SaaS debt trap. When their multiples collapsed, the SaaS incumbents took on record debt, bought back their own stock, and dressed the whole thing up as an AI strategy. Salesforce ran the most extreme version. HubSpot, Workday, ServiceNow, and Adobe ran variations. The bounce worked once. The endpoint is a debt-driven death loop that ends in a Bending Spoons offer letter. I made a prediction of a bounce in valuations in June, when I wrote The Last Great Head Fake in Software History, but this is not what I was expecting.
Had you asked me in April, I could not have imagined this was the playbook every leader in the category would run. In April I wrote Software Is Over. Intelligence is the new core substrate. SaaS is the legacy one. Five months later, watching what the incumbents actually did in response, I think I might have been too soft. This is my update.
If speed is the cornerstone of AI-first, look at what five months just did to the legacy SaaS category and apply that same speed to your own thinking.
The data-center bubble was the wrong bubble to watch. The SaaS debt trap is the one with real legs, and it is closer to snapping than the market has priced.
The substrate has only hardened
The market was already pricing my April thesis in when I wrote the anchor. The SaaS index fell 6.5% in 2025 while the S&P 500 rose 17.6%. Median SaaS revenue multiples went from 18x in 2021 to about 3x. IBM dropped 13.2% on February 23, its worst single day in more than 25 years, after Anthropic showed Claude Code modernizing COBOL. Jasper went from $120 million to $55 million in revenue in one year as soon as the model layer improved.
Every one of those data points has firmed up. Anthropic in particular. The $30 billion ARR mark I cited in April was an end-of-Q1 pace. Bloomberg reported in August that the annualized run rate crossed $65 billion at the end of July, up sevenfold from the $9 billion it exited 2025 on. Yesterday Bloomberg cited the New York Times reporting Anthropic is on track to top $100 billion in annualized revenue this year and could list as soon as November. Q2 2026 revenue alone was $11.5 billion, up 14x year over year. That is just Anthropic.
Sit with that. Anthropic added a Snowflake plus a Palantir to its run rate every quarter this year. Every dollar of that spend is a dollar of intelligence sitting under whatever screen a SaaS incumbent is still trying to charge for. Cheaper tokens compound the pressure because they make the AI-native replacement cheaper to build, every model improvement makes it easier to build. I walked the pricing dynamics in Peak Token.
Put a market-cap frame on the same shape. Anthropic alone, at $965 billion (and expected to trade at IPO for double that), is worth more than Salesforce, Adobe, ServiceNow, Workday, and HubSpot combined. Those five names sit at roughly $544 billion of public equity as of September 18. Add OpenAI at $852 billion. The two leading language-model labs are approaching two trillion dollars in private equity value, comparable to a multiple of the entire pure-SaaS public category.
To say model companies are eating the world is an understatement. Think about it this way, that value is only the language-model slice of the AI puzzle. There are other core brains coming right behind them. Fei-Fei Li’s World Labs raised $1.23 billion for spatial world models. Isomorphic Labs is training protein folding out of DeepMind. Microsoft’s MatterGen is training materials science. Physical Intelligence and Skild AI are training robotics foundation models. Runway is training video. Suno is training music. ElevenLabs is training voice. Black Forest Labs is training image. DeepSeek is shipping open-weight frontier releases. xAI is training Grok. Perplexity is training answer models. Poolside is training code. At Collective[i] we trained the Economic Model. Each are critical brains and each are taking over.
Every one of these is a market a language model cannot address on its own. Every one has serious capital training against it right now. Some will end up bigger than what the LLMs unlocked. The substrate is competing on the balance sheet, and it is already winning.
The substrate is compounding faster than the incumbents can rebrand around it. This is the single most important number in the SaaSpocalypse thesis, and it has only gotten stronger.
The substrate is compounding faster than the incumbents can rebrand around it. This is the single most important number in the SaaSpocalypse thesis, and it has only gotten stronger.
The buyback was the strategy. Claudeforce was the packaging.
Salesforce’s own stock proved the thesis, then reversed it, then proved it again in real time. It dropped 30% through June to a $147 low. By early September it had ripped to $263. On September 18 it closed at $237.92. The round trip took two weeks. The thing that changed was not the product.
Here is the mechanical sequence. In February 2026, Salesforce’s board authorized a $50 billion share repurchase. In March the company issued $25 billion in senior unsecured notes with maturities running to 2066 and routed the proceeds into the largest accelerated share repurchase in history. Initial delivery retired 103 million shares in one quarter at a $198.34 reference price, roughly 80% of the expected total. Final settlement lands later on the ASR-period VWAP. A separate $6 billion five-year term loan closed the Informatica acquisition. Senior notes on the balance sheet went from $8.5 billion to $33.3 billion in one quarter. All five months before Claudeforce.
Read the sequence for what it is. Salesforce entered March with $7.3 billion in cash. Management had capital and chose to borrow anyway. If Benioff believed Agentforce was going to reaccelerate the business, he would have kept the powder dry and spent it on a proprietary model, partnered on another ecosystem deal, or a lab-scale strategic stake. That left customers on their own to come up with their AI strategy. Kirkland and Latham are doing exactly that with a fraction of the balance sheet of a salesforce, because none of their partners had a solution to offer. I walked the substrate argument in Software Is Not Going Down Alone and the operating model in The Hypothesis Company. Salesforce chose the buyback. That is a private-equity capital structure, not a growth-company one worth their current multiples.
On August 26 at the Q2 FY27 earnings call, Benioff announced Claudeforce. Claude inside Salesforce. Salesforce inside Claude. Thirty-seven prebuilt sales skills. He also gave the sell side the line they had been waiting for.
“This nonsense of the SaaSpocalypse, I think it’s time for it to stop.” Marc Benioff, Q2 FY27 earnings call, August 26, 2026
“This nonsense of the SaaSpocalypse, I think it’s time for it to stop.” Marc Benioff, Q2 FY27 earnings call, August 26, 2026
The stock jumped 22.58% in two days. Salesforce marked its Anthropic stake up by $2.7 billion in the quarter. That single line item covered 96% of the earnings surprise. The Anthropic position is worth about $5 billion and represents close to two-thirds of the entire Salesforce Ventures strategic portfolio. On the same call, Benioff floated selling the stake to help pay down the buyback debt. Two paper gains, one cash event. Neat.
When you put the marketing polish aside, any Salesforce customer with an API key could have called Claude the day before Claudeforce. What the announcement really gave every SFDC customer was a first-class path to replace the SFDC front end with an AI-generated CRM over a weekend. The workflows, the data, the schema are now reachable by any agent that can write SQL and hit a REST endpoint. Front-end lock-in was a big piece of the moat. Claudeforce handed customers the key to that piece.
Credit where Salesforce did read the game partially right. The Anthropic investment, the Claudeforce narrative, the AI wrapper on the legacy stack, and the $2.7 billion quarterly markup are what a partial ecosystem play looks like. It is why Salesforce squeezed a bounce out of the last two........
