Could China become a hegemon in Asia? Back in 2023, I wrote a column arguing that fears of Chinese regional hegemony were overstated, though not entirely fanciful. A longer version of that argument was subsequently published in the Spring 2025 issue of International Security. I argued that not only had most modern bids for regional hegemony failed (the United States being the sole exception due to some unusually favorable circumstances), but the prospects for a strong balancing coalition in Asia were good. Most of China’s neighbors did not want it to dominate the region, and neither did the United States. Given the propensity of major powers to balance threats, I concluded that an overt Chinese bid for hegemony was likely to fail and that Beijing would be unwise to attempt it.

I still find the logic of this argument convincing, but I gave insufficient weight to the possibility that U.S. President Donald Trump would be as impulsive, misguided, and incompetent a steward of foreign policy as he has proved to be. I assumed that the presence of vocal China hawks like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, aided by a bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill, would keep U.S. power sufficiently focused on helping our Asian allies keep China in check.

Could China become a hegemon in Asia? Back in 2023, I wrote a column arguing that fears of Chinese regional hegemony were overstated, though not entirely fanciful. A longer version of that argument was subsequently published in the Spring 2025 issue of International Security. I argued that not only had most modern bids for regional hegemony failed (the United States being the sole exception due to some unusually favorable circumstances), but the prospects for a strong balancing coalition in Asia were good. Most of China’s neighbors did not want it to dominate the region, and neither did the United States. Given the propensity of major powers to balance threats, I concluded that an overt Chinese bid for hegemony was likely to fail and that Beijing would be unwise to attempt it.

I still find the logic of this argument convincing, but I gave insufficient weight to the possibility that U.S. President Donald Trump would be as impulsive, misguided, and incompetent a steward of foreign policy as he has proved to be. I assumed that the presence of vocal China hawks like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, aided by a bipartisan consensus on........

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