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As the Iran war drags on, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—face an acute paradox. They still depend on the United States for protection from Iran. But that protection has proved its limits while simultaneously increasing the risk of Iranian attacks.

In response, the GCC states have adopted several overlapping strategies. They continue to cooperate with the United States, particularly to defend militarily against Iranian strikes. But at the same time, they are diversifying their regional security relationships, pursuing diplomacy, and, when necessary, engaging directly with Tehran. The last of these measures may seem duplicitous, but for Gulf states, it is a necessary survival mechanism. What’s more, a long war with rising costs may push the Gulf states toward greater even accommodation with Tehran.

As the Iran war drags on, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—face an acute paradox. They still depend on the United States for protection from Iran. But that protection has proved its limits while simultaneously increasing the risk of Iranian attacks.

In response, the GCC states have adopted several overlapping strategies. They continue to cooperate with the United States, particularly to defend militarily against Iranian strikes. But at the same time, they are diversifying their regional security relationships, pursuing diplomacy, and, when necessary, engaging directly with Tehran. The last of these measures may seem duplicitous, but for Gulf states, it is a necessary survival mechanism. What’s more, a long war with rising costs may push the Gulf states toward greater even accommodation with Tehran.

Given the war’s mounting economic, material, and human costs, it’s no surprise that GCC frustration with Washington has surfaced. In mid-August, the Washington Post quoted one Gulf official as saying, “Trump started this war … and we are paying the price.” The Gulf states have little choice but to stick with their main protector while the drones and missiles are flying, but they are nonetheless growing more nuanced and less U.S.-centric as the conflict drags on.

The largest and most influential GCC member, Saudi Arabia, offers perhaps the clearest example of how the Gulf states are seeking to diversify their security strategy. Prior to the war, Saudi Arabia sought a formal, NATO-style mutual defense treaty with the United States, one that would more forcefully obligate Washington to come to Riyadh’s aid in the event of an attack. Additionally, Riyadh sought advanced weapons systems, intelligence-sharing, and basing arrangements to deter the threat from Iran. In the end, under the November 2025 Strategic Defense Agreement, Saudi Arabia obtained a less binding agreement but secured approval to obtain advanced F-35 fighter jets. It was a compromise that, while falling short of Riyadh’s wishes, at least signaled the kingdom’s top-tier relationship with Washington.

When war came, Saudi Arabia found itself with an ally that eschewed consultations, vacillated on war aims and strategy, was unable to fully protect the region from Iran’s counterattacks, and........

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