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In recent weeks, the Saudi-Emirati rivalry has literally exploded into the open. It happened in Yemen, where Saudi airstrikes targeted arms shipments bound for the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in late December. Riyadh then leaned heavily on Abu Dhabi, which belatedly gave up its ally when the STC agreed to dissolve. The stark contrast with 2015—when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates launched a joint intervention in Yemen to curb Houthi influence there—was obvious for all to see.

But the split goes beyond Yemen. Elsewhere, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had long backed opposing sides in Sudan’s civil war but somehow managed their competition. Now, all understandings are apparently frozen: In late 2025, the Saudis allegedly lobbied the United States to sanction the UAE, arguing that it was complicit in Sudan’s appalling internecine violence. Riyadh also pressured Somalia to throw out the Emirati military and cancel all its existing financial contracts with Abu Dhabi. The UAE struck back by inking a $3 billion gas deal with India, which observers saw as a move to cultivate a counterweight to Saudi Arabia’s long-standing friendship with Pakistan.

In recent weeks, the Saudi-Emirati rivalry has literally exploded into the open. It happened in Yemen, where Saudi airstrikes targeted arms shipments bound for the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in late December. Riyadh then leaned heavily on Abu Dhabi, which belatedly gave up its ally when the STC agreed to dissolve. The stark contrast with 2015—when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates launched a joint intervention in Yemen to curb Houthi influence there—was obvious for all to see.

But the split goes beyond Yemen. Elsewhere, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had long backed opposing sides in Sudan’s civil war but somehow managed their competition. Now, all understandings are apparently frozen: In late 2025, the Saudis allegedly lobbied the United States to sanction the UAE, arguing that it was complicit in Sudan’s appalling internecine violence. Riyadh also pressured Somalia to throw out the Emirati military and cancel all its existing financial contracts with Abu Dhabi. The UAE struck back by inking a $3 billion gas deal with India, which observers saw as a move to cultivate a counterweight to Saudi Arabia’s long-standing friendship with Pakistan.

Behind these headlines lies a deeper divide between two rival visions of the regional order. Under Mohamed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi has long pursued a revisionist grand strategy, employing military force and supporting secessionist groups within weak states to complement its significant soft power. This approach has brought influence—but also long-term entanglements that the UAE has yet to fully resolve. Saudi Arabia has traditionally been a status quo power that stresses stability above all else. This changed under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, when Saudi statecraft briefly looked more like Abu........

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