After nearly a year of chaotic, stop-and-start efforts to broker a cease-fire in Ukraine, the Trump administration remains deeply involved in talks to stop the war. Unsurprisingly, the most vexing topic remains territorial concessions—in Trump-speak, “land swaps.” And until now, diplomats have not come up with anything likely to solve it.

The discrepancy between the original pro-Russian 28-point plan that surfaced in November 2025 and the reworked Ukrainian-U.S.-European version speaks volumes about how far Ukraine and Russia remain from each another. The 28-point plan calls for international recognition of all currently Russian-held territory as well as marking the entirety of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as Russian. The plan amounts to a surrender ultimatum for Ukrainian forces, and it positions Russia perfectly to eventually re-start its campaign in a better position.

After nearly a year of chaotic, stop-and-start efforts to broker a cease-fire in Ukraine, the Trump administration remains deeply involved in talks to stop the war. Unsurprisingly, the most vexing topic remains territorial concessions—in Trump-speak, “land swaps.” And until now, diplomats have not come up with anything likely to solve it.

The discrepancy between the original pro-Russian 28-point plan that surfaced in November 2025 and the reworked Ukrainian-U.S.-European version speaks volumes about how far Ukraine and Russia remain from each another. The 28-point plan calls for international recognition of all currently Russian-held territory as well as marking the entirety of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as Russian. The plan amounts to a surrender ultimatum for Ukrainian forces, and it positions Russia perfectly to eventually re-start its campaign in a better position.

The 20-point counterproposal calls for fighting to be halted at current battle lines, which will become the lines of contact. It refuses to recognize any of the Russian gains in eastern Ukraine or Crimea as legal. Ukraine says it can accept Washington’s proposed demilitarized zones and a free economic zone in the part of the Donetsk region that it controls, but it also wants Russian-held territory of equivalent size to be included, too.

The void between these proposals is where U.S. international affairs analyst and former negotiator in the Balkans Edward P. Joseph has jumped in. In a recent journal article, Joseph proposes using the template of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244, which was adopted in June 1999 and affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) but called for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo.” After a unanimous vote in the UNSC, Kosovo was emptied of Serbian and Kosovar Albanian militaries and placed under an interim U.N. administration with an international security force.

Nearly 27 years later, Kosovo remains a protectorate of the U.N.—although one in which elected Kosovar officials govern broadly and police themselves. Joseph argues that the logic of Resolution 1244’s postponement of the legal question of........

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