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U.S. President Donald Trump has made coercion a central element of American statecraft—and not just against Washington’s adversaries. In his second term, Trump has liberally wielded sanctions, tariffs, trade policies, and other threats to pressure allies and partners. Attimes, he’s even demanded that they set aside critical legal and institutional commitments.

There are, however, limits to Washington’s coercive leverage. The United States retains enormous advantages over its allies in finance, technology, markets, and security. But those advantages become most powerful when allied governments leave their own citizens, companies, and institutions to face Washington alone.

U.S. President Donald Trump has made coercion a central element of American statecraft—and not just against Washington’s adversaries. In his second term, Trump has liberally wielded sanctions, tariffs, trade policies, and other threats to pressure allies and partners. Attimes, he’s even demanded that they set aside critical legal and institutional commitments.

There are, however, limits to Washington’s coercive leverage. The United States retains enormous advantages over its allies in finance, technology, markets, and security. But those advantages become most powerful when allied governments leave their own citizens, companies, and institutions to face Washington alone.

U.S. allies cannot eliminate the structural advantages Washington possesses, but they can reduce the vulnerabilities that constrain their own foreign-policy choices. They have more agency than their often-hesitant responses suggest. By acting collectively, changing the incentives facing their own private companies, and building credible alternatives for essential services, they can raise the cost of Washington’s coercive diplomacy and protect the institutions and commitments that underpin the rules-based order.

One striking example of Washington’s coercive diplomacy is U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s campaign to “systematically dismantle” the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United States has now sanctioned 13 ICC staff members, including nine judges. After former chief prosecutor Karim Khan, a British citizen, was designated for sanctions, he lost access to his official email and his bank accounts were blocked. Kimberly Prost, a Canadian judge, lost her credit cards and even her Amazon devices stopped functioning normally. Contractors and nongovernmental organizations have curtailed cooperation with the ICC.

The consequences of these designations extend far beyond the individuals targeted. They have disrupted not only the Palestine investigation that provoked the current U.S. campaign, but also the ICC’s work on atrocities in Sudan, Ukraine, and other situations.

However, the United States cannot dismantle the ICC on its own. It is not a party to the Rome Statute, it contributes nothing to the ICC’s regular budget, and it has no vote in the Assembly of States Parties. Rubio does not need parties to the Rome Statute— such as Japan, Germany, or France—to formally sign on to his campaign to dismantle the ICC. But he does need their banks and companies to fear U.S. sanctions.

By leveraging access to the American economy and the threat of enforcement, Washington can pressure private actors abroad to make U.S. sanctions felt far beyond U.S. territory. In other........

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