The article argues that public-budget cleanups of rivers such as the Ganga and Jukskei fail because funds go unspent and no constituency has a direct economic stake, whereas a river that supports boats, terminals and riverfront businesses creates defenders of water quality.

Singapore’s 1977–1980s cleanup succeeded by pairing a named authority and fixed deadline with resettlement of 26,000 families and relocation of polluting trades, after which commercial redevelopment locked in the gains; Nairobi is attempting a similar model while Johannesburg’s failing treatment plants show the opposite problem.

Four design principles are offered: tie commercial licenses to published water-quality standards, ring-fence license revenue for dredging and monitoring, resettle communities before redevelopment (reserving 20 percent of river length for traditional users), and name a single authority with a hard deadline.

Why river cleanup programs keep stalling, and what Singapore, Nairobi and Johannesburg suggest for the rest of the Global South

In 2021, Johannesburg Water measured more than 2 million E. coli per 100 milliliters in the Jukskei River. Reporting on those readings treats 200 as the level of high contamination.

The picture on the Ganga is no better. India’s own auditor found in 2017 that eight of 10 priority towns along the river failed even the minimum standard for outdoor bathing, with coliform levels between six and 334 times the safe limit.

The usual explanation is a lack of money or will. The record suggests otherwise. The same audit found that only 8 percent to 63 percent of the funds budgeted for the Namami Gange mission were actually spent in the three years it examined. Of 154 project reports due for approval, only 71 had been approved.

The Ganga Action Plan began in 1985. The problem is not that nobody has planned a clean river. It is that nobody with money at stake is watching the river.

My argument is simple. A river cleaned only through the public budget has........

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