With Hamas and Hezbollah substantially weakened, Iran is increasingly relying on the Houthis as its principal remaining proxy to exert military and economic pressure on the United States and regional partners, including by targeting shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and striking Saudi targets. 

The Houthis are pursuing overlapping objectives: supporting Iran’s campaign against Saudi Arabia and Gulf states while also advancing their own long-running conflict with the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized Yemeni government. 

Although the partnership remains mutually beneficial for now, it could weaken if Iran’s regime is decisively damaged or if a lasting political settlement in Yemen reduces the Houthis’ need for Iranian support.

With Hamas and Hezbollah substantially weakened, Iran is increasingly relying on the Houthis as its principal remaining proxy capable of exerting sustained military and economic pressure on the US and its regional partners.  Currently, as a complement to Iran’s campaign in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis are attempting to exploit their control of the Bab al-Mandab strait, situated at the foot of the Red Sea and controlling access to the Suez Canal.  

Simultaneously with harrying the shipping in the strait, they are striking targets in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with Iran, whose 2023 pact with Saudi has been consigned to the trash.  

On February 28, 2026, in response to the US-Israeli attack, Iran launched missiles and armed drones against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, mainly because they harbored US bases, but also to punish and deter both Saudi and other governments for their close connection to the US.

Iranian strikes were reported to have hit energy facilities in Saudi, including igniting a fire at the Ras Tanura oil refinery. The Prince Sultan Air Base was also targeted by drone attacks, then and later.

On July 16, Reuters, citing multiple regional and Iranian sources, reported that Iran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to........

© Eurasia Review