From the tribal lashkars of 1947 to the Taliban of today, the Pakistan Army has converted other people’s wars into its business model. The result isn’t just a devastated Afghanistan; it’s a standing threat to regional and global security.

Pakistan’s military establishment has spent decades turning Afghanistan into a managed battlefield—an arena to be penetrated, pressured, and periodically punished so that no Afghan government can fully control its sovereignty or pursue an independent regional policy. That doctrine is usually packaged in the language of “strategic depth,” “counterterrorism,” or “Line of Control ‘LOC’/Durand Line security.” In practice, it has looked like a repeatable cycle: build proxies, weaponize instability, sell “solutions” to outside powers, and then reset the crisis whenever Afghanistan begins to slip outside Pakistan’s control.

The recent escalations—airstrikes, drone attacks, and cross-LOC violence—fit this pattern. What makes the latest phase distinct is the recurring sequence of Washington validation followed by Afghan bloodshed: moments when Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and self-declared Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir are publicly praised by President Donald Trump, followed soon after by Pakistani attacks inside Afghanistan that Afghans and UN-linked reporting describe as involving civilian casualties.

Timing alone does not prove causation. But when timing repeats in the same political rhythm—praise, photo-ops, diplomatic uplift; then bombs over Afghan territory—it becomes a pattern that deserves documentation, not dismissal.

1. The enduring machinery: a proxy doctrine that outlives governments

Pakistan’s proxy playbook is not a rumor; it is a documented historical method. In Kashmir in 1947, thousands of tribal irregulars were used as deniable shock troops. In 1965, Pakistan’s infiltration plan (Operation Gibraltar) attempted to trigger rebellion in Indian-administered Kashmir; it failed, but it reinforced the army’s preference for irregular war. In 1971, paramilitary auxiliaries in Bangladesh intensified atrocities and deepened the military’s institutional trauma after defeat and partition—helping harden the conviction that proxies are cheaper than conventional wars.

Then Afghanistan became the ultimate marketplace. The CIA’s program to arm and finance Afghan mujahidin during the Soviet occupation Operation Cyclone”—ran through Pakistan’s ISI, which became the gatekeeper of money, weapons, and factional power. The program didn’t merely fight the Soviets; it created an infrastructure that could be repurposed: training pipelines, financing channels, clerical networks, and sanctuary routes. It also empowered the ISI as a state within the state.

That is why Pakistan is often described as a country where the army does not defend the state so much as own the state’s strategic direction. The military’s incentives are not aligned with peace. A stable Afghanistan—a government strong enough to police borders (excluding the De Facto regimes), resist coercion, and build independent partnerships—would weaken the “strategic depth” doctrine and shrink the army’s leverage over regional diplomacy.

2. When the army’s business model meets the international system

The world has repeatedly paid Pakistan to be indispensable: first as the gateway for anti-Soviet jihad, later as the “frontline ally” in the War on Terror, and now as a broker of “stability” between a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and nervous regional capitals. Each phase has included funding, diplomatic indulgence, and strategic tolerance—often justified by the claim that Pakistan is necessary to contain an even worse threat.

But this dependency creates a perverse dynamic: if Pakistan’s value is tied to its ability to manage (or inflame) the frontier, then instability becomes profitable. When outside powers reward Pakistan most during crises, the incentive is to keep crises renewable.

Pakistani Defense Minister Khwaja Asif has publicly acknowledged the severity of Pakistan’s economic crisis, stating that the country is financially broken and comparing it to a lame body that needs crutches to walk. He described Pakistan as being on a ventilator, emphasizing that U.S. financial assistance is among the few remaining sources of “oxygen” keeping the economy afloat—and that even more support is needed to prevent collapse. He had previously delivered unusually blunt public admissions about Pakistan’s dependence and transactional alignment with Western wars. In a parliamentary speech reported internationally, he said Pakistan was “used … and then thrown away,” even saying it was treated “worse than a piece of toilet paper” after serving U.S. strategic purposes. Separately, in his interview with Sky News anchor Yalda Hakim, he openly acknowledged that Pakistan had been doing the “dirty work” of the United States and the West—“including Britain”—for roughly three decades, implying those wars were fought in exchange for the money and support Pakistan received.

This helps explain why Pakistan has long been accused—by Afghans, Indians, and at times Western intelligence reporting—of a double game: claiming counterterrorism while preserving “good militants” as assets; condemning extremism while tolerating sanctuary networks; demanding sovereignty while repeatedly violating Afghanistan’s.

On September 30, 2025, Trump publicly praised Pakistan’s leadership—specifically “the prime minister and the self-declared field marshal of Pakistan”—calling them “incredible” and saying they backed his plan “100%.”

Within days of these remarks, the Pakistani military carried out overnight airstrikes in Kabul and Paktika, reportedly killing dozens of civilians, including women and children. The strikes, conducted around midnight, sparked widespread condemnation and heightened regional tensions, particularly given Pakistan’s simultaneous appeals for international financial support. The cross-Durand Line violence escalated into intense clashes. By October 15, 2025, Reuters reported that airstrikes and ground fighting left “more than a dozen civilians dead and 100 wounded,” and that the two sides agreed to a temporary truce. By October 19, 2025, Reuters reported a ceasefire.

On February 19, 2026, Trump presided over the inaugural meeting of a U.S. “Board of Peace,” attended by Sharif as part of Pakistan’s high-level engagement with Trump’s peace initiative. Trump said: “Prime Minister Sharif — I like this man … your Field Marshal, great general … great guy,” and also called Munir a “tough… good fighter.”

Only two to three days later, Pakistan launched strikes into Afghanistan. On February 21, 2026, Pakistan carried out strikes on civilians in Khogiyani district of Nangarhar province in Afghanistan in which 17 members including women and children of one family were killed. The following day, UNAMA said that civilians were killed and injured in Pakistani airstrikes.

On February 24, 2026, during his speech at state of union, Trump again referenced the Pakistani PM and described Munir as “highly respected,” “a field marshal,” while recounting his India-Pakistan ceasefire claim.

As clashes worsened, Pakistan declared an “open war” posture. On February 27, 2026, Pakistan bombed major cities in Afghanistan and carried out air and ground strikes. On the same day, during his remarks amid Taliban-Pakistan fighting reports quote Trump praising Pakistan’s leadership and saying he gets along “very well” with Pakistan, mentioning both Sharif and Munir.

This matters because it shows how easily the “counter-terror” narrative can turn into a LOC coercive campaign—especially when international messaging signals tolerance or prioritizes short-term stability over Afghan sovereignty.

4. The political logic: why praise in Washington can look like permissive space

A Pakistani general staff does not need an explicit written “green light” to act. International politics often functions through signals: who is welcomed, who is praised, who is treated as indispensable, and who is publicly framed as a “partner.” If Pakistan’s top leadership receives warm validation in Washington—especially in a moment of heightened regional tensions—Rawalpindi can interpret that as diplomatic cover to act aggressively against Afghanistan while still presenting itself as a cooperative ally.

Trump’s public praise of Sharif and Munir is not only symbolism; it shapes the narrative environment. It positions Pakistan as a valued partner while Afghanistan is framed primarily as a source of militancy and disorder. That asymmetry—praise for Islamabad, suspicion toward Kabul—makes it easier for Pakistan to violate Afghan sovereignty, kill civilians and still claim legitimacy as a counter-terror actor.

5. “Destroy the U.S. weapons left behind”: Trump’s obsession and Pakistan’s targeting claims

Trump has publicly argued that U.S. aid should be conditional on the Taliban returning U.S. military equipment left in Afghanistan. More broadly, Trump has repeatedly said the U.S. should either retrieve the equipment or destroy it—language he used as early as late 2025 when he argued that if the Taliban would not return U.S. equipment, the U.S. should at least “destroy them with a bomb.”

Now compare that rhetoric to the way Pakistan frames its strikes. Reuters reported that Pakistan’s 2026 campaign included hitting “Taliban military sites, depots, and drone storage facilities,” and Reuters described heavy explosions in Kabul linked to a strike on a weapons-related site during the February escalation. The narrative alignment is politically useful: Trump emphasizes a weapons problem in Afghanistan; Pakistan claims it is striking weapons and munitions sites. Even if Pakistan’s actions are primarily driven by its own security doctrine and rivalry dynamics, the rhetorical overlap helps Islamabad present its violations of Afghan sovereignty as indirectly serving U.S. concerns.

A cautious and defensible way to state the conclusion is this: Trump’s public fixation on “left-behind weapons” helps create an informational environment in which Pakistani strikes can be sold as a form of “clean-up” against Afghan military assets—even when civilian casualties are reported by UN-linked bodies.

6. The China factor: Wang Yi’s Kabul visit (Aug 20, 2025) and Pakistan’s strategic anxiety

On August 20, 2025, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi visited Kabul and met Taliban officials, with discussions reported to include mining and Afghanistan’s possible participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s official readout also confirms the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral foreign ministers’ dialogue held in Kabul that day.

What can be responsibly argued from these facts (without inventing motives) is an inference: China’s deepening engagement with Kabul threatens Pakistan’s gatekeeping role. If Afghanistan can diversify external partnerships—especially with a powerful actor like China that is interested in minerals, trade corridors, and political influence—Pakistan’s leverage over Afghanistan’s economy and diplomatic options could shrink. In that context, coercive escalation becomes a tool to remind Kabul that external alignment comes with a cost.

This is where the analysis becomes sharper: Pakistan’s “strategic depth” doctrine is not only about security; it is about controlling Afghanistan’s choices—its alliances, trade routes, and political space. When Kabul appears to gain new external breathing room (Chinese diplomacy, regional connectivity talks), Pakistan’s military establishment may interpret it as a threat to its long-standing strategic monopoly.

And again, the timing matters: China’s Kabul diplomacy in August 2025 is followed weeks later by Trump’s public praise of Pakistan’s leaders on September 30, and then by major Pakistan-Taliban violence in October.

7. What this pattern means: the proxy army that owns a proxy state

Pakistan’s military establishment operates as something rarer than a “state sponsor of proxies.” It behaves like a proxy force with its own state apparatus—a military regime so dominant that it can use civilian governments as diplomatic packaging while the army retains strategic direction. When that regime receives international validation, it often converts that legitimacy into operational freedom: more coercion against Afghanistan, more sovereignty violations, and recurring civilian harm documented by international media outlets and organizations including the United Nations.

In that sense, the Pakistani Army is not merely one proxy manager among many. It is a uniquely durable institution that owns the state that owns the proxies. And because this machinery has repeatedly produced transnational militants, regional destabilization, and international blowback, it becomes not only Afghanistan’s tragedy but a global risk.

The world should read the sequence carefully: praise in Washington, bombs in Kabul. If the international system continues rewarding Pakistan’s generals while Afghan civilians absorb the costs, then “strategic depth” will remain what it has always been: a profitable doctrine of managed instability—one that threatens not just Afghanistan, but the wider region and beyond.

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