Economic Sanctions, State Power, And Cuba: A Rothbardian Critique Of U.S. Interventionism – OpEd
The piece details how 2019 and 2026 U.S. executive orders have intensified sanctions on Cuba, targeting fuel shipments, third-country suppliers, financial institutions, and even family members or humanitarian transfers.
Measures such as the cutoff of Visa and Mastercard and expanded sectoral sanctions are said to raise costs for ordinary Cubans and foreign firms while relying on broad national-security claims with limited specific evidence.
Drawing on Murray Rothbard, the author criticizes the policy as coercive extraterritorial intervention that substitutes state power for voluntary exchange and extends U.S. influence under the guise of security and democracy promotion.
In 2019, the first Trump administration imposed many new sanctions against Cuba, including measures that targeted fuel shipments and raised the legal and financial penalties on foreign firms engaged in supplying fuel to the island. Consequently, the number of suppliers willing to service Cuba has declined, while those that continued to do business there have generally charged higher prices to compensate for the increased political and commercial risk.
More recently, the crisis in Cuba deepened when the United States began seizing tankers carrying Venezuelan crude oil destined for the island. Venezuela served as Cuba’s principal external energy supplier since 2000. However, since the mid-2010s, economic collapse and declining oil production have weakened Venezuela’s ability to provide Cuba with subsidized energy supplies. Nonetheless, Venezuelan crude continued to meet approximately 40 percent of Cuba’s energy needs in 2025.
In January 2026, the United States further intensified its sanctions policy by expanding economic restrictions and increasing pressure on third-party governments and commercial actors maintaining business ties with Cuba. To be more specific, President Trump issued Executive Order 14380 on January 29, which declared a national emergency and authorized additional measures targeting countries that continued to supply fuel to Cuba. The order itself stated that an:
. . .additional ad valorem rate of duty may be imposed on goods imported into the United States that are products of any other country that directly or indirectly [includes intermediaries or third countries] sells or otherwise provides any oil [including both crude oil and petroleum products] to Cuba.
. . .additional ad valorem rate of duty may be imposed on goods imported into the United States that are products of any other country that directly or indirectly [includes intermediaries or third countries] sells or otherwise provides any oil [including both crude oil and petroleum products] to Cuba.
Executive Order 14380 also asserts that “the Government of Cuba has taken extraordinary actions that harm and threaten the United States.” That said, the order provides little concrete evidence to substantiate these claims, instead relying on broad allegations that the Cuban government “aligns itself with—and provides support for—numerous hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors adverse to the United States,” including Russia, China, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. It........
