Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not the whole problem. He spent 2026 arguing over when his term ends and only on 1 September, under foreign pressure, agreed to elections within seven months—a calendar a president should not get to bargain. The piece’s point: parliament and courts were too weak to stop him. That is a shared failure.

The inheritance is older than any current name: Siad Barre denounced clans while staffing by clan; superpowers paid for order, not institutions; the 2000 Arta “4.5” clan quota was meant to be temporary and still runs Mogadishu. FMS presidents (Lafta Gareen in South West, Qoor Qoor in Galmudug) backed Villa Somalia when it paid and objected when it didn’t. Federalism copied centralization downward. Donors preferred calm to conditions.

The system works for those inside it. Swap the president and the networks, the 4.5 formula, the quiet donors, and the rubber-stamp legislature stay. Fix: enforce the constitution, a court that can say no, transparent FMS money, aid tied to reform, retire 4.5. Until Mogadishu, the regions, and the donors own their piece, Somalia will keep changing presidents and keep the same arrangement.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not the only one at fault. Responsibility here is shared.

Somalia’s problem was never one president. Every few years the country convinces itself otherwise, fixes its anger on whoever sits in Villa Somalia, and waits for his replacement to fix what he broke. The replacement rarely does, because the men around him, in Mogadishu, in the regional capitals and in donor missions, built their careers inside the same arrangement he now runs. Somalia has no shortage of critics of bad governance. What it lacks are enough people willing to admit they benefited from it.

Mohamud’s own year illustrates the point. His government spent most of 2026 disputing with the opposition over when his term should legally end, and only on Sept. 1 did he agree, under pressure from international mediators, to hold elections within seven months. A president should not be able to negotiate the constitutional calendar with his own country. That he could suggests the institutions meant to settle such questions, parliament, the judiciary, were not strong enough to do so. That is a shared failure, not solely his.

The pattern is familiar by now. A new leader takes power promising reform. Over time, he weakens the institutions meant to check him and rewards loyalty over competence. Somalis grow frustrated. Regional presidents issue statements. Donors express concern. Eventually he is replaced, and the country treats his departure as the end of the problem rather than one chapter in a longer one.

It rarely is the end. The names change. The habits........

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