The Sunni and Shia divisions are acutely increasing in Pakistan; this should be approached with care. This narrative is built upon exaggeration, bias in presentation in most cases, and in some instances, proactive propaganda. Pakistan is not a society that the sectarian labels prevail, and life of the population is marked by the competition of the schools of thought. It is grounded on a Muslim identity, a comparable national narrative and a long history of co-existence despite theological pluralism. This does not mean that there are no tensions as there is no friction-free society. Nevertheless, it also implies that making broad statements about a growing Sunni Shia split is not always accurate in its perception of the social fact of the country and exaggerates cases to form a non-existent picture of national disintegration.

What is more evident is that the more Maslak’s have co-existed in Pakistan and lived with each other over the generations with the familiarity, the respect and the common ordinary human contact. Towns, city and village families trade with one another, co-educate, co-work, share same institutions, same civic space. Pakistanis are prone to meet either as neighbours, colleagues, classmates or nation members, but not to face each other as the representatives of the opposing sects. The normal tradition of co-existence is much more powerful than the trumpets clamouring, which strive to transform every conflict into a national storm. Those who shout that Pakistan is on the road to extreme sectarian division are likely to overlook the fact that, much closer to the earth, there is normal life, in which millions of people continue living and adjusting to one another.

The second assumption, which connects regional tensions to Sunni Shia conflict in Pakistan is also a fallacy. Foreign commentators are likely to read the happenings in the Middle East, especially wars with Iran or other issues in the region and generalize this to the situation and the Pakistani society and assume that it must react in the same way. That assumption is weak. The nation of Pakistan has its political past; it’s very religious culture and its very social equilibrium. Unity, restraint and brotherhood have been emphasized upon by the religious leadership of the country, the older generation and even the national institutions. The most frequent note, on which the majority appeal is most resorted to, is that of peace and unity, rather than war in the sermons and the general messages, and in forums of the religions, and in the statements of the nations. This is significant in the meaning that it means that mainstream trend of the country is towards stability. When it is said that Pakistan is drifting back into a Sunni Shia split, it fails to realise that there are quite vocal voices that stand on both the religious as well as general life that disagree with the course.

The other problem with the sectarian explanation is that it divides the Pakistani Muslims into minute groups and the greater unity that holds them together is forgotten. Shia, Sunni, Deobandi, Barelvi and the others are only a subset of greater Muslim fraternity of Pakistan. They share a common national flag, a common constitutional arena, share the sorrow in the period of tragedy and share the pride in the national success. The existence of the country does not prove the concept that the sectarian identity is stronger nowadays than Pakistani identity. When it comes to the crisis of the nation, whether it is a security issue, a calamity or recession in the economy or even a push by the foreigners, there is no reaction of the Pakistanis as disintegrated sectarian camps. They respond as one people. Far more informative than this trend of repetition are sensational headlines. The fact that the country has been able to unite when the pressure was great speaks much about the country and not criticism that is supposed to divide the country.

One should also note the way propaganda is working. In most cases the hostile discourses have established a permanent perception of Pakistan as an unstable, intolerant or sect-based state. These images are not always the blameless mistakes. Sometimes they are part of a larger plot to discredit social unity of the state, and to provide within the country dissimilarity as the pre-emptive sign of dismantling. This is a familiar method. Take a few isolated cases, out of context, and flog them to death, and then tell us that they are typical of the whole nation. But some shallow moments can never explain a country as large and diverse as Pakistan. A national sectarian outburst is not evidenced by a small conflict, an irresponsible utterance, a local trouble. The latter amounts to distortion, once such incidences are bundled into blanket statements regarding the dichotomy of Sunni-Shia.

This does not mean that violence and sect-based targeting should not be denied or downplayed. In Pakistan, terrorism has claimed its cost and people of most sects and communities have been killed. And that is the inaccuracy of the sectarian narrative. The terrorism in Pakistan has not been discriminative against one school of thought and directed the other. It has struck broadly and brutally, and it has been on sectarian grounds with the citizens. It has been a common struggle therefore in the country. Besides burying the victims of different backgrounds Pakistanis have condemned extremist violence as well, and in the same breath it has helped in defeating militancy. That suffering is commonplace and should not be made a testimony of invariable sectarian division. It ignores the unity which emerged in the response to the violence and national refusal to surrender the people to the violence extremists.

© Eurasia Review