Cuba is currently facing intensifying economic hardships and political strain. Debates over the beleaguered nation’s future have grown within the global left and inside U.S. policy circles. Trump has signaled a return to hardline sanctions and “maximum pressure,” while Marco Rubio continues to champion extreme measures aimed at undermining the Cuban government. Washington has once again warned of regime change over political engagement.

In this exclusive interview for FPIF, Daniel Falcone interviews Adrian H. Hearn, professor of Spanish and Latin American Studies at the University of Melbourne. He is author of Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and Development (Duke University Press, 2008), Diaspora and Trust: Cuba, Mexico, and the Rise of China (Duke University Press, 2016), and Food System Intermediaries: Bonding and Bridging in China and Latin America (MIT Press 2025). Hearn explains how Cuban civil society interacts with the state within a complex field of interdependence shaped by revolutionary history. Cuba’s sovereignty hangs in the balance, but so does a deeper question about what the revolution’s legacy represents.

Daniel Falcone: How do you define “civil society,” particularly in the context of Cuba and how do you approach writing about Cuban civil society in your research?

Adrian Hearn: I recognize that Cuba’s civil society is mixed rather than dualistic. Political reality in Cuba does not reflect a dualistic social structure characterized by autonomous groups on one hand and robust state institutions on the other. Rather, it shows an interpenetration of state authority and independent action in a civil sphere that is more mixed than elsewhere. My approach to defining civil society in Cuba therefore departs from mainstream models that treat civil society as inherently separate from the state.

Drawing on the theoretical work of Cuban political scientist Rafael Hernández, who in turn draws on Antonio Gramsci, I find that Cuban schools, workplaces, and most other organizations on the island operate to some extent under state hegemony as vehicles of popular education and production. In the case of a socialist society like Cuba, many organizations are found not in the private but in the state sector, yet they are increasingly spaces of debate and contestation where cultural and ideological identities evolve.

This recognition shapes my research methodology. Rather than examining civil society’s independence from the state, I focus on processes of interdependence, exchange, and counterpoint. I study the “meeting grounds” between state and society through combined political analysis with anthropological method. My ethnographic residence in temple-houses in Old Havana and Santiago de Cuba, combined with interviews across state institutions and community organisations, has allowed me to document how community interests do not typically develop along a “linear” path toward independent official representation, but instead have become at least partially integrated into state hegemony. Understanding this integration, rather than lamenting it, is essential for grasping the character and potentials of Cuban civil society.

Daniel Falcone: A number of U.S. organizations are pressing the U.S. government to lift the blockade. How can American civil society support Cuban sovereignty?

Adrian Hearn: U.S. civil society organisations play a contradictory role in relation to Cuban sovereignty. On one hand, U.S. policy aims to undermine Cuban state authority. The Cuban Democracy Act, or “Track II” [diplomacy] legislation, committed to “reaching around” the Cuban government to support organizations that could eventually destabilize it. The U.S. government’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba invested substantial resources to “influence Cubans to turn away from communism and move to democracy and a free-market economy.”

However, certain U.S. civil society groups adopt progressive approaches. Global Exchange, to name just one of many, pioneered people-to-people relationships at the grassroots. This philosophy emphasizes bringing ordinary U.S. citizens to Cuba to show them the reality behind the media, conducting “reality tours” through Cuban host institutions. This represents an attempt to accommodate Cuban sovereignty, which is now carried forward by numerous U.S. universities that even under current political conditions maintain their study abroad programs on the island.

I have found that international engagement based on capacity-building and support for institutional reforms already under way has better prospects for strengthening civic democracy than antagonistic attempts to bring about “regime change.” Over 60 years, the U.S. trade embargo has strengthened rather than weakened the position of hard-line elements within the Cuban administration and made peaceful reconciliation with the United States less likely. This conclusion is supported each year in the United Nations votes condemning the trade embargo.

Organizations like The People’s Forum that resist the blockade prioritize Cuban self-determination as a platform for international solidarity. The growing number and reach of such solidarity groups demonstrate that significant sectors of U.S. civil society reject an isolationist and aggressive approach.

Daniel Falcone: What is the history of U.S. involvement in Cuba? Democratic socialists seem divided on the revolution’s impacts.

Adrian Hearn: U.S. involvement in Cuba traces back to the Spanish-American War of 1898, which marked the overthrow of Spanish colonial rule and simultaneously the arrival of diplomats, soldiers, and missionaries from the United States. This period established what I understand as a fusion of national policy with evangelical purpose, where ideological constructs and cultural pressures converged. As Margaret Crahan of Columbia University has shown, the post-1898 period witnessed rapid Protestant expansion, facilitated by strong connections with Cuba’s U.S.-compliant administration. These connections established deep ideological ties between U.S. interests and Cuban religious institutions. These came to the forefront of Cuban policy after 1959, as the revolution fundamentally challenged the social order that had benefited from U.S. hegemony.

Regarding contemporary divisions among democratic socialists, I have observed that the left remains divided on how to evaluate the revolution’s impact. Some view the revolution as having fundamentally betrayed socialist principles through its authoritarianism, whilst others defend it as a necessary response to U.S. imperialism and the constraints of the blockade. My research suggests that both perspectives contain truths.

The current crisis stems from Cuba’s forced reintegration into global capitalism after the Soviet collapse, combined with the U.S. embargo’s ongoing pressure. Yet I have found that the revolution’s commitment to social justice remains reflected in widespread popular recognition and identification with revolutionary achievements, even as economic pressures force difficult compromises. The emergence of community self-help organizations over the past decade suggests a gradual process of civil pluralization capable of amplifying previously silent voices, particularly among Cubans of African and Chinese descent. This indicates potential for reform and adaptation.

Daniel Falcone: Moving forward, what can help to stabilize Cuba and strengthen its social and political structures?

Adrian Hearn: I can imagine several potential paths forward, though under current circumstances outcomes are uncertain and will depend both on U.S. policies and how effectively the Cuban state manages collaboration with emerging civil society actorswhile maintaining national sovereignty.

First, I think international engagement based on respect for Cuban self-determination should be a broadly shared goal. This is because healthy international economic and political relations will strongly impact the management of local development in Cuba. Approaches that support institutional reforms already under way have better prospects for success than antagonistic interventions. The evidence from my research suggests that collaborative rather than confrontational international engagement produces more sustainable outcomes.

Second, I believe Cuba should continue developing the decentralized economic and welfare initiatives it has been rolling out for more than a decade. By linking state institutions with nascent community organizations and neighborhood associations, these initiatives have demonstrated capacity to address local needs. The key is maintaining balance between commercial viability, stable governance, and community welfare. This is a significant but not insurmountable challenge.

Third, I see potential in strengthening horizontal linkages between independent social groups, including Christian and Afro-Cuban religious communities. Historically, these communities have maintained syncretic relationships and shared concerns for community welfare. Deepening these connections, particularly through mutual aid activities and collaborative social projects, could amplify their representative capacities and create more robust civil society structures.

Fourth, I think the Cuban state should reflect on economic reforms modelled on Chinese and Vietnamese experiences, as Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel have acknowledged. These reforms could allow greater social and economic freedoms while maintaining political stability. However, such reforms must be carefully managed to avoid the social inequalities that have emerged in those and other “state-capitalist” countries.

Finally, I believe the most promising path for Cuba (and the world) involves recognizing that the meaning of modernity is not fixed. Cuba can integrate local traditions with global economics through “glocalization” to protect social, spiritual, and material interests through cultural exchange and adaptation. This approach, rooted in Fernando Ortiz’s theory of transculturation, has always characterized Cuban development. As Ortiz argued, it offers a model for navigating emerging challenges by maintaining an inclusive national identity while safeguarding sovereignty.

This article was published at FPIF

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