Cyber response can fail with the services it protects when shared identity, cloud and communication platforms go down, so exercises must treat the response apparatus itself as a potential casualty.

Plans need dependency maps, pre-agreed local safety permissions for operational technology, and reconciliation steps before automation resumes after reconnection.

These can be tested in existing frameworks by removing one shared dependency and measuring coordination, continuity and safe recovery rather than assuming backups will work.

Governments rehearse attacks on critical infrastructure. They must also test what happens when the digital systems used to coordinate the rescue become unavailable.

Imagine a cyber emergency unfolding across several water utilities. Operators have identified suspicious activity and need to isolate an affected connection before the problem reaches physical equipment. The national response team has assembled, but its incident platform is unreachable. The shared identity service that authenticates officials is down. The latest procedures sit in a cloud repository that requires the same login. A contractor with the expertise to help cannot obtain emergency access.

The people are ready to respond. Their machinery for organizing a response has failed.

This scenario is hypothetical. Its underlying weakness is real enough to deserve a place in national preparedness: the infrastructure supporting cyber response may share dependencies with the infrastructure under attack. An incident can disrupt a public service and the government’s ability to coordinate its recovery at the same time. National resilience must be tested against that combined failure.

Europe has already begun exercising the larger crisis. In June, Cyber Europe 2026 brought together approximately 5,000 participants to rehearse severe cyber disruption of rail and maritime transport. The exercise also tested the European Union’s Cyber Blueprint, which clarifies responsibilities and coordination during a cross-border cyber crisis. These are substantial preparedness investments. The next test should place the response apparatus itself among the systems assumed to be at risk.

The warning is increasingly relevant. In September, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity reported that digital dependencies expand the attack surface. As governments and contractors consolidate identity management, cloud administration, document repositories and communication tools, a disruption in one common service can reach several organizations simultaneously. A different app or supplier logo offers little protection if the alternative still relies on the same authentication or control........

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