*Originally published in 2025 and preserved as part of our archive project. E-International Relations is free to read. We rely on reader support to make this possible.

The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Criminality, Political Interference, and Corruption in the Criminal Justice System – commonly referred to as the Madlanga Commission after its chair, retired Judge Mbuyiseli Madlanga – has captured national attention due to the gravity of the allegations it was established to investigate. The Commission emerged in response to claims made by Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla "Lucky" Mkhwanazi, the Provincial Police Commissioner of KwaZulu-Natal, a province historically characterised by fierce political competition and persistent struggles over access to state resources (Ngcobo, 2025). On 6 July 2025, Mkhwanazi publicly alleged that both the Deputy National Police Commissioner and the Minister of Police were using their positions to shield a criminal syndicate (Singh, 2025a). These accusations, levelled against individuals occupying senior positions in the policing and political hierarchy, raised significant concerns about the integrity of the criminal justice system and the depth of political interference in law-enforcement processes. In response to the seriousness of these claims, President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed the Madlanga Commission to investigate the matter. The Commission thus functions not only as a fact-finding mechanism but also as a critical test of the state's commitment to confronting entrenched corruption and rebuilding public trust in South Africa's policing institutions.

The Madlanga Commission, of course, would not be the first commission of inquiry into high-level malfeasance in South Africa. Instead, it is at least the second significant commission established in the last few years that would appear to have repercussions of more profound national consequence. Earlier, the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption, and Fraud in the Public Sector, including Organs of State (commonly referred to as the Zondo Commission, after its chairperson, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo), was held from 21 August 2018 to 15 June 2022. The Zondo Commission findings were cataclysmic. They determined, in an extensive report, that several integral facets of the state had been captured. State-owned enterprises were misappropriated, government contracts were manipulated, and state resources were siphoned off, all for the benefit of corrupt public officials and private individuals (Radulovic, 2023b; Uys & Radulovic, 2025). After all, state capture necessitates the enactment of precisely such behaviours, as the phenomenon is a form of systemic corruption where institutions and public policies are shifted away from the public interest and redirected toward private interests (Dávid-Barrett, 2023).

A recent progress report from the Presidency of South Africa (2025: 4) on the implementation of the actions in President Ramaphosa's response to the 218 recommendations of the Zondo Commission indicated that: 10 cases have been "finalised with verdict, conviction, acquittal, withdrawal, or terminated investigation"; 36 cases are enrolled, are in progress, or have been partially finalised; 111 cases are under investigation "with regular progress updates"; 9 cases are "delayed but proceeding"; 35 cases are "stalled due to external dependencies such as extradition requests"; and with 17 of the cases no investigation has been initiated or authorised. Thus, since the completion of the Zondo Commission, only roughly 4.5% of the cases have been fully finalised, and it is important to emphasise that the outcomes of acquittal, withdrawal, or termination of investigation have been ringfenced within the banner of 'finalised'. There has also been a lack of action taken to hold the perpetrators accountable, with the law moving very slowly to respond to Zondo's recommendations and the main architects remaining at large.

A Long History of Capture

An argument can be made that all states are, to some degree, subject to capture. Initially, the term 'state capture' was reserved for post-socialist Eastern European countries transitioning from planned to market economies. This transition was often incomplete, marred by interference, irregularities, contextual constraints, and geopolitical competition (Longhurst, 2016; Uzelac, 2003). State capture also manifests in fully-fledged liberal democracies. In the West, it is "driven by global finance and liquidity" with financial corporations disproportionately influencing political structures (Visser and Kalb, 2010: 176). In the United States, for example, J.P. Morgan played a pivotal role in the early development of the American financial system, contributing significantly to the creation of the Federal Reserve. Later, Goldman Sachs played a pivotal role in the development of mortgage-based derivatives, with its executives occupying key state positions. Western European banks have employed a similar anchor model to influence state structures across the continent (Visser and Kalb, 2010).

In South Africa, the state capture revelations, investigated by the Zondo Commission, implicated Former President Jacob Zuma (who served as the country's president from 2009 to 2018), along with several public officials and influential businesspeople. However, South Africa has a long history of grappling with state capture (across regimes – both autocratic and democratic) and that capture had transpired, in some way, from the very arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in Table Bay (in what is present-day Cape Town) on 6 April 1652. Van Riebeeck was sent by the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), commonly referred to as the Dutch East India Company, "to set up a revictualling station at the Cape to provision their ships travelling between Europe and the East" (Abrahams, 1993: 3). The Fort de Goede Hoop (Fort of Good Hope) was established by van Riebeeck and a small company of men, in the style of contemporary Dutch fortifications (Abrahams, 1993).

At first glance, van Riebeeck would have appeared to be a true 'company man', for a company – the VOC – that "pioneered features which later became textbook characteristics of modern corporations" (Gelderblom, de Jong & Jonker, 2013: 1050). The VOC lasted for nearly 200 years, being one of the first joint-stock companies in the world, and having operated as a chartered trading company involved in the transaction of goods ranging from spices to textiles to precious metals. With the Company being primarily responsible for shipping trade between Europe and Asia (Lucassen, 2004), the advanced capitalist nature of the Dutch Republic enabled it to spearhead Europe's expansion into Asia (Robertson & Funnell, 2012). By some accounts, the VOC was "the original military-industrial complex" (Taylor, 2013). With it being granted quasi-governmental status, it possessed "the power to wage war, imprison convicts, establish colonies, and mint its own coins" whilst standing at the forefront of a lucrative slave trade (Christabel, 2022). It was a vessel for colonisation, one which possessed an absolute trade monopoly. By virtue of that fact, it was, in itself, a corrupt entity.

Van Riebeeck, operating within and benefiting from this structurally corrupt corporate machinery, was himself implicated in the corrupt practices that characterised the VOC. He had been accused of corruption at the VOC's Tonkin trading post in Vietnam, abusing his official position (as the head of the post) for private benefit (Blackman & Dall, 2021). However, van Riebeeck's corruption did not bear nearly enough fruit for him, as the "pickings at the Cape were too slim for him to make any real cash" (Blackman & Dall, 2021: 2). Van Riebeeck had, aside from the rather economically unsuccessful abuse of his position as the Cape's first commander, also set "in motion a process of land expropriation for the success of the service and benefit of his employer" (Blackman & Dall, 2021: 4), a process which continues to have ramifications for South Africa to date.

In the 1650s, the Cape "was not a sufficiently developed bureaucratic state" for corruption, as we know it today, to thrive (Blackman & Dall, 2021: 4). By the time the outpost had graduated into a colony, Willem Adriaan van der Stel would position himself to profit off it significantly. Willem Adriaan van der Stel was the second Governor of the Cape Dutch Colony (from 1699 to 1707) and the eldest child of the Colony's first governor, Simon van der Stel. Both were service members of the VOC, and both were corrupt; however, Willem Adriaan was particularly corrupt and cruel. Simon was an effective administrator, but........

© E-International