This article was shortlisted as a finalist in the 2024 E-International Relations Article Award, sponsored by Edinburgh University Press, Polity, Sage, Bloomsbury and Routledge.

SAARC was established in 1985 at the initiative of Bangladesh to create a regional forum aimed at promoting welfare, social progress, and economic growth in South Asian nations. India holds a pivotal role as one of the founding members of the organization. The other member states include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Of these, India is the only country with contiguous land boundaries with all the other member countries except Afghanistan. SAARC was envisioned with the foundational values of improving quality of life and accelerating economic growth in the region. After a series of meetings at the official and political levels, the first South Asian Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in New Delhi in 1983, where the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) (Lama 1998) was adopted. IPA laid the groundwork for cooperation between member states in areas like agriculture, rural development, and health. Broadly, the objectives aimed to foster active collaboration, mutual trust and assistance, and strengthen cooperation. Despite the South Asian nations' mixed records on collaboration, informal meetings alongside SAARC meetings have nudged the member states to resolve their differences. A notable example (Iqbal 2005) is India and Pakistan diffusing tensions arising from India’s military exercise “Operation Brasstacks” along the Indo-Pak border. Heads of both member states met and engaged in informal talks during the 2nd SAARC Summit held in Bengaluru in 1986.

Subsequently, the SAARC Charter (“the Charter”) was adopted on 8th December 1985. To further the collaborative efforts in the region, Article III of the Charter provided that the heads of state of member governments shall meet once a year or more as needed. However, the last SAARC summit was held in 2014 in Kathmandu, and no summit has been held thereafter due to India-Pakistan differences. These issues underscore the challenges facing SAARC, with India's concerns playing a pivotal role in the organization's stagnation. Therefore, India must assert its role as a pivotal power in SAARC, contrasting with Indonesia's role in ASEAN.

ASEAN, Southeast Asia’s primary multilateral organization, was established in 1967. It is a 10-member organization consisting of Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN's foundational principles include informal consultations, consensual decision-making, and non-interference in internal affairs to maintain regional order. However, the key principle ensuring regional stability amid great power dynamics is “ASEAN Centrality”, which allows relatively weaker ASEAN countries to secure themselves from anarchical great power politics or an imposed hierarchical hegemonic order within the region and externally. This principle is deeply ingrained in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Historically, Indonesia has adhered to the principle of ASEAN Centrality, thereby benefiting the organization through its leadership and establishing itself as an integral member. This is an area where India falls short or fails to achieve within SAARC. The author examines India's challenges in SAARC, contrasting them with Indonesia's proactive role in ASEAN. Regional powers play a pivotal role in organizational growth and there is a need for increased engagement among SAARC members to revitalize the organization. The author concludes by providing policy recommendations, emphasizing the lessons India can learn from Indonesia's ASEAN efforts.

Regional Organization and the Role of the Pivotal Power

The creation of regional organizations is necessary to foster cooperation in both political and economic spheres while also simultaneously providing a platform for dialogue on regional issues. More often than not, regional organizations contain at least one pivotal power, possessing the size and influence to rein in the region’s dynamics. Historian Paul Kennedy, in 1996, defined pivotal power as countries with disproportionate influence in a particular region. Pivotal powers are an essential variable in forming a regional organization, alongside shared values of states et al. As Mohammad Ayoob (1999) suggests, a consensus regarding the role of a pivotal power, with the concurrence of the pivotal power, segues into internal cohesiveness and establishes boundaries beyond which relations do not extend (Ayoob 1985). The presence of a pre-eminent regional power can aid in shaping regional cohesiveness by aligning it with its ambitions and capabilities. However, it can also misuse its inherent capabilities to clamp down on weaker members if its dominance is questioned. Therefore, gaining legitimacy from smaller member states is crucial to creating a united regional organization (Ayoob 1999). To supplement it, Realists underline the existence of a pivotal power that can aid international cooperation. In South Asia and Southeast Asia, both India and Indonesia have assumed the role of pivotal power considering their growth rate, economic size, and geographical features in SAARC and ASEAN respectively.

Indonesia as a Pivotal Power

Indonesia’s demography and resources, amongst other features, make it the pivotal power in ASEAN. Indonesia's effective use of power has further reinforced its leadership position within ASEAN Indonesia emerged from Konfrontasi with Malaysia in 1964. During this period, the level of distrust among Southeast Asian nations was notably high. Despite these differences, Indonesia played a vital role by demonstrating its willingness to form a regional cooperative mechanism. Under Soeharto’s 'New Order' regime, Indonesia extended significant goodwill and consequently became a founding member of ASEAN. The regime focused primarily on political reparations (as seen with Malaysia subsequently), regionalism, and a globalist approach. Notably, Indonesia ensured the adoption of regional resilience at the first summit held in Bali in 1976 (Desker 2017). The Indonesian foreign policy has premised its view of regional order on Inclusive Regionalism (Anwar 2018). This approach is evident in Indonesia’s attempts to put ASEAN at the centre of all the engagements, be it the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) or the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. In a similar vein, Indonesia has more often than not included the USA and China in ASEAN-related initiatives, thereby not offending the sparring goliaths of the world. Moreover, Indonesia has unfailingly put ASEAN unity at the forefront of its vision for regional order. Therefore, it can be reasonably inferred that ASEAN centrality has aided Indonesia in positing a less hostile appearance and encouraged active participation from other member countries. Hence, the Indonesian role as a pivotal state has not faced protest, owing to its low-profile approach in the bloc.

India as a Pivotal Power

Meanwhile, in the Indian scenario, the distrust among the member nations emanates from the Indira doctrine (Ogden 2019; Aryal & Bharti 2023). Pertinently, the doctrine dissuades any external influence in the dynamics of the South Asian Region while promoting bilateral relations. The doctrine is usually termed India’s Monroe Doctrine ‘buttressed by the principles of Bilateralism’. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi viewed the South Asian Region as an exclusive zone of supremacy and dominance, thereby promoting India to be an uncontested regional hegemon. Further, the Indira Doctrine can also be considered as an extension of ‘The Nehru Creed’ Lal (2020), which justifies intervention by India in the neighbouring countries’ internal affairs if the disorder has spillover effects beyond the country's boundaries. This is reflected in India’s intervention as the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the Sri Lankan Civil War, which was not perceived well in the Region. Taking these aspects into consideration, it is easier to sense a pulse on why the countries developed mistrust about India.

India’s initial response to the proposal to establish SAARC already indicated its disinclination towards the idea. Additionally, the then Bangladeshi President implicitly characterized India’s role in SAARC by comparing it to Indonesia’s accommodating role in ASEAN, suggesting that India should adopt a more modest role given regional asymmetry and economic disparities (Reza and M. 2016). However, neither India mollified its presence nor did other member states’ perception of it change. Therefore, contrary to being acknowledged as a pivotal power state, India was perceived by all other member countries of........

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