The Role of United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea in the South China Sea Disputes
This is an excerpt from Asian Territorial and Maritime Disputes: A Critical Introduction. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.
Interstate conflicts have shaped the destiny of nations since the very beginning of their formation. Wars between and within states have helped to forge the current international system, creating new laws and governments, and solidifying ancient ones. However, conflicts also jeopardize peace and security around the world, especially when they do not receive due attention from the international community. One such conflict is currently underway in the South China Sea (SCS). The tensions are territorial in nature, with some parties claiming the rights to islands based on international law and conventions, and others asserting their claims as historical rights. Overtime, as tensions increased, the parties have attempted to settle their dispute with the help of international bodies, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the application of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, little to no success has been achieved in decreasing the conflict in the region. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to provide a geopolitical and legal overview of the SCS disputes, focusing on the importance of the region and identifying the different territorial claims; (2) to explain the major attempt at conflict resolution in the region made through UNCLOS and the PCA; and (3) to critically analyse the impact of UNCLOS on the SCS disputes, highlighting its merits and shortcomings in the region’s main attempt at conflict resolution.
The second section of this chapter provides a background on the SCS conflict, focusing on the reasons and the details for it. It examines the strategic importance of the region, as well as analyses the various territorial claims, explaining the assertions made by the primary claimant states. The third section reflects on the dispute settlement mechanism under the auspices of UNCLOS, providing an overview of the convention to guide the discussion. Then, it investigates the arbitration between the Philippines and China, which was brought before the PCA. The fourth section provides a brief analysis of the UNCLOS conflict resolution mechanism in light of the South China Sea Arbitration.
The SCS encompasses several hundred small islands, reefs, and atolls, almost all uninhabited and uninhabitable, within a 1.4 million square mile area (Bader 2016). Two island groups – the Spratly and Paracel Islands – have been the primary focus of the disputes for decades due to their significance to the coastal countries surrounding them.
First, the region is rich in oil and natural gas reserves, but accurate estimates are difficult to find. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the area contains 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190-500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (EIA 2013), while the Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the number of barrels may be as high as 130 billion (Kaplan 2015). Second, the area is a major trading route. Namely, it is considered as one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world with an annual trade of US$5.3 trillion passing through the region (CFR 2017). This number represents half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage and a third of all maritime traffic globally (Kaplan 2015).
Additionally, the oil transported through the South China Sea coming from the Indian Ocean is three times greater than the amount that transits the Suez Canal and 15 times more than what goes through the Panama Canal. The primary driver for this has been the increase in China’s oil consumption, as well as a large part of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan’s energy supplies coming through the region. Hence, it is no surprise that control of the area is of extreme importance. For instance, China has dubbed the South China Sea its Second Persian Gulf: not only does 80% of the country’s crude oil imports pass through the region, but also a huge assortment of goods (Kaplan 2015; CFR 2017).
This aspect of the region is one of the major causes for the contentions regarding the islands, since many of them lie in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Thus, it is not surprising that these coastal states, along with China, Brunei and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, are pushing forward with their own territorial claims in the area. Each wants to secure its own national interests by asserting their rights to exclusive exploitation of the region through the utilization of international law and other mechanisms to assure those are protected and exercised.
Furthermore, the South China Sea has some of the world’s richest reef systems, with more than 3,000 indigenous and migratory fish species. It also constitutes more than 12% of worldwide fishing (Greer 2016). Thus, the region offers abundant fishing opportunities, and whoever has control over its waters will have the potential to support and further develop its fishery sector. This aspect of the SCS has already led to many clashes in the region between the Philippines and Chinese fishing vessels (Kaplan 2015; EIA 2016).
Moreover, competition over fisheries in the area has been escalating, and it tends to increase more over time once fishing in the region becomes more jeopardized. In 2008, it was already estimated that the fishery stocks in the region were becoming depleted, with 25% being over-exploited and 50% fully exploited without any attempts at developing sustainable fishing practices in the region (Greer 2016).
The claims in the SCS are twofold. While some allegations are based on historical rights, others appeal to provisions of UNCLOS. These multiple territorial claims indicate a lack of agreement among the parties, which resulted in a regional conflict that has been happening for decades. The analysis of these claims (Figures 1.1 and 1.2) will be made in light of UNCLOS guidelines from 1982, since all coastal states in Southeast Asia have ratified it. Thus, an overview of most claimant parties will be conducted, to clarify their allegations and highlight the leading issues in the conflict, focusing on claims made by China and the Philippines, to better establish the case studied in this chapter.
Hanoi claims the Spratly and Paracel Islands along with the Gulf of Thailand. However, unlike China, Vietnam has not written its extended claims over the South China Sea in official texts or maps. As far as the Spratly Islands are concerned, in the 1970s, Vietnam established them as an offshore district of the Khanh Hoa Province, occupying several islands. That same decade, China seized the archipelago in a military engagement known as the Battle of the Paracel Islands (EIA 2013; Tonnesson 2000). In a bid to solidify its claims, Vietnam employed archaeologists to provide evidence to support the country’s long historic presence in the SCS. It was asserted that the state has actively dominated both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century (BBC 2016). Consequently, China, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines oppose Vietnam’s claims.
Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted their territorial claims in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009 (CLCS 2009). The submission was considered legitimate, and the countries had to clarify their positions on the legal status of features and limits of their claims in the region (EIA 2013; Nguyen 2020). Vietnam also adopted a maritime law in 2012 in which it claimed jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, requiring that all naval ships from foreign states register with Vietnamese authorities when passing through the region (EIA 2013).
Kuala Lumpur’s participation in the SCS disputes started in 1979, when the Malaysian Department of Mapping and Survey unveiled an official map placing the Spratly Islands within the country’s continental shelf (Roach 2014). This map overlapped the EEZ and continental shelf of Malaysia and other states, which drew protests from neighbours including China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Although Malaysia’s claim was considered weak by some legal analysts (EIA 2013; Roach 2014), it was not inferior to China or Vietnam’s claims to the entire Spratly archipelago.
In 2009, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of UNCLOS[1], Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted to the CLCS information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured in respect of the southern part of the South China Sea (CLCS 2009). To date, the CLCS did not make any recommendations matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. Nevertheless, the actions of these two countries can be regarded as steps within international law to solidify their claims.
A decade later, in 2019, Malaysia made a partial submission to the CLCS for the remaining portion of states’ the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the northern part of the SCS (Malaysia 2017). Previously, Malaysia’s position on the dispute had often been characterised as subdued: practicing quiet diplomacy and demonstrating a willingness to strengthen bilateral ties with China, rather than confronting Beijing publicly (Parameswaran 2016). Following their latest submission, Kuala Lumpur’s strategy seemed to change, leaning towards compliance with UNCLOS and departing from an alignment with China’s position. Additionally, Malaysia has also used diplomatic, political, and economic measures to sustain its claims by improving its ties with the United States and supporting a united front on the part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Parameswaran 2016; Nguyen 2020).
After it gained independence in 1984, Brunei released maps in which it declared a 200-nautical mile EEZ overlapping the Chinese nine-dash line and a continental shelf extending to a hypothetical median with Vietnam. In so doing, the Brunei government claimed part of the Spratly Islands archipelago closer to its EEZ in the north of Borneo (Rüland 2005). Perceived for years as a silent claimant, Brunei bases its claims on UNCLOS (EIA 2013; Putra 2021).
Brunei has often adopted a cooperative, neutral stance regarding the SCS disputes, being in favour of a collective approach to providing maritime security and resolving disagreements (Brunei’s Ministry of Defence 2011). At times, however, the sultanate has sided with China’s preference for bilateral agreements, due to its weaker military power and dependency on oil reserves to sustain its economy and monarchical rule (Putra 2021).
The People’s Republic of China bases its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands on historical naval expeditions dating back to the 15th century (EIA 2013). In 1947, the Kuomintang – then, the party in control of China – drew a line around the aforementioned islands, calling it the nine-dash line map (Figure 1.3). In doing so, China declared its sovereignty over all islands enveloped by this line (Nguyen 2015). After the Communist Party ascended to power in 1949 and established the PRC, the new government continued to use this map in official correspondence and claimed rights to the waters within it. Currently, China maintains its claim over the SCS based on this and other historical evidence (EIA 2013).
In 2009, following the joint submission of Vietnam and Malaysia to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), China submitted the nine-dash line map to the CLCS, seeking to solidify its claim and legitimize it beyond 200 nautical miles.[2] China’s claims resulted in Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines also declaring rights over the islands and various zones in the SCS, directly contesting the Chinese claims (EIA 2013). However, the nine-dash line map is not in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS. Namely, the Convention stipulates guidelines on baselines, the........
