From Liberal to Pluriversal Peace? Peacebuilding 25 Years after Afghanistan
October 7, 2001, brought an end to the Liberal Hegemonic Order (LHO) before it had even begun. The ‘rules-based’ Liberal Hegemonic Order (LHO), the ideological expression of a Pax Americana which underpinned the international order from the end of the Cold War allegedly saw the global expansion of human freedom and sustained economic growth (Ikenberry, 2011, 2018). Hegemony, as the Marxist political thinker Gramsci reminded us in his Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, 1992), rests on consent as well as coercion. The illusion rather than the exercise of power allows the hegemon to rule not through fear but acquiescence. October 7 shattered that myth. The US flexed its muscles in launching the ‘good’ War on Terror against what they deemed misogynistic, medieval Muslim fanatics who harboured the terrorist mastermind of the attacks of September 11, 2001: Osama bin-Laden. The invasion and subsequent occupation managed to garner the support of the “international community” of sovereign states against a transnational, invisible enemy: a particular, globalized form of Wahhabi Political Islam as represented by al-Qāeda. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) triggered article 5 – which states that an armed attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against all members – for the first time and only time in its history (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2025) and, at last, found a convincing raison d’etre after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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The US-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was legitimized by the “international community” and, in particular, by the United Nations (UN), through the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401 (UNAMA, 2026). Invasion proved relatively straightforward with the collapse of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Də Afghānistān Islāmī Imārat; IEA). Occupation proved to be more difficult. The reconstruction of Afghanistan, undertaken at considerable cost in terms of funds and lives, lasted twenty years and represented America’s ‘longest war.’ However, the initial stated objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom—the destruction of the leadership of al-Qāeda—had been met ten years before the eventual US withdrawal. President Barack Obama declared an end to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, yet US forces remained under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, while NATO continued its presence through the Resolute Support Mission. The goals of the continued US occupation, legitimized by the wider international community, were rationalized with reference to key components of liberal peacebuilding: a commitment to statebuilding, liberal democracy, economic liberalization, human rights and security, and gender empowerment.
However, on August 15, 2021, the government of President Ashraf Ghanī fell to forces of the Islamic Movement of the Taliban (Də Ṭālibānō Islāmī Taḥrīk; hereafter the Taliban). Ghani, the democratically elected head of state, had earlier fled Afghanistan in the face of the US withdrawal. The Taliban returned to power, largely unopposed. Figures for casualties vary but have been estimated at 176,000-212,000 (Human Costs of War / Brown University, 2026), including 46,000 civilians (Hartung, 2024). It is estimated that the US alone spent almost $1 trillion on the war (Malkasian, 2026). In short, Afghanistan represented a defeat not only for the US but for liberal peacebuilding (Dodge, 2021; Mac Ginty, 2025)
This short article will first attempt to critically interrogate the role liberal peacebuilding played in the legitimization of imperialism which, it is argued, still shapes the theory and practice of international relations (IR) (Shani, 2024). It will, furthermore, suggest that a pluriversal approach to peacebuilding is better able to conceptualize political difference in a post-Western world. Liberalism is a secular ideology which emerged from within a particular cosmology, or rather constellation of cosmologies, which comprise the modern West. The West here is deployed not as a civilization with a set of core, doctrinal beliefs confined to a specific geo-cultural territory (Huntington, 1993, 1996) but as a hegemonic “self” defined with reference to an “other.” It draws upon sets of evolving, overlapping and frequently contradictory cosmologies, rooted in both Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions which, after the renaissance, reformation and Enlightenment, gave rise to a particular form of modernity: secular modernity. This conception of modernity, which has a material basis in capitalism, is indistinguishable from the historical process through which it has been “globalized:” coloniality (Quijano, 2007). The concept of cosmology refers to a set of normative epistemological and ontological claims about the origins of the cosmos and our place in it with implications for the way we understand the relationship between territory, culture and difference; the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular;’ and humans and the environment (Behr and Shani, 2021; Shani, 2026). It will take Afghanistan as an illustrative example since the language of liberalism was deployed to legitimize the invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11.
In Afghanistan, this language came to incorporate far more than the initial military objectives of the post-2001........
