DESPITE being hydrologically the most unscientific proposition, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was implemented for one reason — it was a good business plan at the time. It was presented by David E. Lilienthal in two essays published in Collier Magazine in 1952, followed by a letter to Eugene Black, president of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), urging him to engage with India and Pakistan for the business opportunity their water dispute had presented. Lilienthal built the business case around the then geopolitical post-World War II mind. His arguments rested on four pillars: post-war peace, Cold War geopolitics, a new economic order and the allure of mega infrastructure projects.

Peace held the key then. The war’s scars were still fresh and all states would support anything which could convincingly prevent another war. Lilienthal argued that if Pakistan won its legal case on water rights against India, war would break out, turning Pakistan into “another Korea”, whereas implementing his proposals would prevent conflict. Lilienthal also framed the IWT through a Cold War lens, arguing that “counting noses in Kashmir” (the plebiscite issue) will........

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