Azerbaijan is the bulwark against two U.S. adversaries — Iran and Russia — and Washington should deepen its strategic presence in the South Caucasus accordingly. That means expanding security cooperation with Baku, removing outdated barriers to U.S. assistance and resisting pressure groups that work against a durable regional peace. A stable settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would open trade routes across Eurasia and strengthen Western influence along a frontier where Iranian and Russian power still seeks to dominate.

The stakes became clear on March 5, when Iranian drones struck Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan, hitting the airport terminal and a nearby school and injuring four people. The drones reportedly had Russian-made parts, raising suspicions about Moscow’s indirect involvement. Azerbaijan responded by withdrawing diplomats from Tehran and Tabriz and mobilizing forces near the Iranian border. A day later Azerbaijani security service has arrested four operatives of Iran’s IRGC that planned to attack the strategic Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, Israel’s embassy and a synagogue. The episode underscores Baku’s strategic position. Azerbaijan sits on the front line between the West and two hostile powers. 

Why Azerbaijan matters to the U.S.

Washington already recognizes the region’s growing importance. During his February visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Vice President J.D. Vance underscored U.S. interest in expanding trade and security ties across the South Caucasus. The administration pledged billions in investment for Armenia’s nuclear energy sector while signing a strategic partnership agreement with Azerbaijan. The visit also highlighted the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, an initiative designed to link the South Caucasus with Central Asia through trans-Eurasian trade corridors.

Such connectivity matters. Azerbaijan’s integration into the Central Asian C5+1 framework would help connect the route with the so-called Middle Corridor linking Europe and Asia. The result could streamline the supply of critical minerals to Western allies, reduce reliance on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and limit Iranian influence in the Caspian region.

Yet the path toward peace remains fragile, particularly in Armenia. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is pursuing a U.S.-backed settlement with Azerbaijan, but his political position is precarious ahead of elections scheduled for June 2026. Armenian politics is increasingly defined by a struggle between two camps.

One camp represents the country’s old power structure, including figures tied to the Armenian Apostolic Church, Russian-linked oligarchs and older political elites. Many of these actors favor closer ties with Moscow and remain hostile to reconciliation with Azerbaijan. The other camp is led by Pashinyan and his Civil Contract movement, which emphasizes democratic reforms and a more independent foreign policy aligned with the U.S. and Europe.

This struggle recently came to the surface when Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, head of the Tashir Group, sided publicly with church leaders criticizing Pashinyan’s reform campaign and peace efforts. Karapetyan was later arrested after calling for the government’s overthrow. If Pashinyan were defeated in June by forces aligned with former president Robert Kocharyan, Armenia could pivot back toward Russia, derailing the emerging peace process.

The future of Armenian politics ultimately lies in Armenian hands. But Washington can still protect the conditions needed for peace and economic integration. The biggest obstacle is an outdated U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan.

Relations between Washington and Baku cooled after the 2023 Karabakh war. They began to recover only after President Donald Trump hosted Ilham Aliyev and Mr. Pashinyan in Washington in 2025. Yet American policy still carries a major contradiction. The continued presence of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, a 1992 provision that restricts U.S. security assistance to Azerbaijan.

Presidents from both parties have repeatedly waived the restriction when strategic necessity demanded it. George W. Bush did so after the Sept. 11 attacks to support cooperation with Azerbaijan during the war in Afghanistan. The Trump administration has extended the waiver again. But as long as the law remains on the books, it signals distrust toward a country that now stands as a counterweight to both Tehran and Moscow.

That contradiction weakens U.S. policy at a time when Azerbaijan faces growing pressure from Iran and Russia. Britain has already lifted its own arms embargo against Baku. Washington should follow suit by repealing Section 907 and building a normal security partnership with a strategically located ally.

Another challenge comes from lobbying groups that portray Azerbaijan as aligned with Russia or Iran. Organizations such as the Armenian National Committee of America have criticized U.S. diplomacy and framed Pashinyan as dangerously dependent on foreign support. Yet these narratives often ignore the Kremlin’s backing for Armenian factions opposed to the peace settlement. In some cases, the same groups have partnered with activist networks such as Code Pink, whose positions frequently align with anti-American foreign policy agendas.

Such campaigns risk undermining the fragile diplomatic progress now underway. Russia’s accidental shoot-down of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet in December 2024 already strained relations between Moscow and Baku. Azerbaijan’s close security cooperation with Israel has also heightened tensions with Iran. In other words, the idea that Azerbaijan advances Russian or Iranian interests is difficult to square with reality.

The United States has a rare opportunity in the South Caucasus. With careful diplomacy, Washington can help secure a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, open a new Eurasian trade corridor and strengthen a strategic barrier against both Iran and Russia.

To do that, American policymakers should deepen engagement with both countries, support Armenia’s reform-minded leadership, repeal Section 907 and ignore pressure campaigns that seek to freeze the region in conflict. Azerbaijan already serves as a bulwark against two U.S. adversaries. Expanding America’s strategic presence in the South Caucasus would turn that reality into lasting peace and prosperity for the region and a geopolitical advantage for the United States.

Dr. Samuel Ramani is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI. He specializes in Russian and Eurasian foreign policy and global security and is the author of books including “Putin’s War on Ukraine” and “Russia in Africa.”

© Daily Messenger (MPNnow)