The recent escalation of hostilities involving United States and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory has raised urgent questions about where the conflict is headed. As military actions unfold and rhetoric intensifies, a sober assessment of the strategic structure of the conflict becomes increasingly necessary. Wars often generate powerful narratives shaped by domestic politics, alliance commitments, and wartime psychology. Yet beneath these narratives lie strategic realities that ultimately determine whether a conflict moves toward escalation, stalemate, or settlement.

Two recent interviews conducted by Norwegian political scientist Glenn Diesen offer a revealing window into these realities. In separate conversations, Diesen spoke with professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran. The two scholars speak from vastly different institutional and national contexts, yet their analyses converge on a troubling conclusion: The present conflict may lack a credible pathway toward termination.

From the perspective of realist international relations theory, Mearsheimer emphasizes a familiar strategic principle. Wars initiated without clearly defined political objectives often drift toward escalation and attrition. Military operations may achieve tactical success while simultaneously deepening the strategic trap in which policymakers find themselves. When leaders cannot articulate what political outcome would constitute victory—or how such an outcome might realistically be achieved—military escalation risks becoming an end in itself.

The dynamics described by Marandi from Tehran reinforce this concern from the opposite side of the conflict. His remarks suggest that Iranian policymakers increasingly interpret US actions not as limited or coercive strikes but as part of a broader effort to impose strategic defeat. When a state believes that external pressure is intended to undermine its economic survival or political system, the incentives for compromise diminish dramatically. Resistance and escalation become the rational response.

Wars rarely end well when they begin without a clear understanding of how they are supposed to end.

Under such conditions, both sides tend to view their own actions as defensive while interpreting the other side’s moves as steps toward existential pressure. This reciprocal perception forms what strategists sometimes describe as an escalation trap. Each escalation appears justified in the moment, yet each step simultaneously reduces the space for diplomatic resolution.

Recent commentary from Tehran reinforces these concerns about escalation dynamics. In a separate interview with Diesen, Marandi of the University of Tehran pointed to the strategic importance of Kharg Island, the hub through which the majority of Iran’s oil exports pass. Speculation in strategic circles about possible attempts to strike or seize the island illustrates how the conflict could quickly move beyond limited military operations toward attacks on critical economic infrastructure. Such a move, he suggested, would likely be interpreted in Tehran not as a tactical action but as an attempt to cripple the country’s economic lifeline, increasing the risk of wider regional retaliation and drawing additional states into the confrontation.

One particularly revealing example emerged in the discussion between Diesen and Marandi regarding the possibility—circulating in strategic commentary—of a US attempt to strike or seize Kharg Island. Located in the Persian Gulf, Kharg Island is the central hub for Iranian oil exports, reportedly handling roughly 80-90% of the country’s shipments. Because of its economic importance, targeting the island would represent a dramatic shift in the character of the conflict.

Military strikes against discrete installations can sometimes be framed as limited actions intended to degrade specific capabilities. Attacks on critical economic infrastructure are different. They signal an effort to........

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