During the interim regime’s period, at least three advisers were involved in efforts to indefinitely delay the election with the ulterior motive of prolonging the tenure of Muhammad Yunus so that they could enjoy numerous benefits and advantages. Their strategy was multifaceted. One of these advisers was clearly opportunistic in his or her role. While publicly presenting themselves as neutral, both sides appeared satisfied with the time they were spending in power. However, this particular adviser was always restless and strategic.

One of the tactics used by these advisers was mob violence. As part of their strategy, mob unrest and intimidation were allegedly incited to create instability. At the beginning, there was discussion about holding elections in the shortest possible time, in line with Professor Muhammad Yunus’s thinking. However, later a large package of reform proposals was presented under the banner of a “National Front,” which effectively extended the timeline and strengthened the interim authority’s grip on power.

Behind the scenes, three advisers reportedly pressured Professor Yunus to delay the election. Their reasoning was that rushing the election would create an unmanageable situation. They argued that law and order were fragile and that the administration might not be able to handle the pressure. However, critics believe that these arguments masked a different objective: prolonging their time in power and tactically positioning their preferred political allies closer to authority.

At the same time, Western pressure and geopolitical considerations were influencing the situation. Regional powers were also extremely active. Some wanted elections arranged as quickly as possible. One underlying objective among certain actors was to end Professor Yunus’s leadership. The advisers attempted to maintain administrative control and tried to convince international powers that holding elections too quickly could lead to instability. They warned that law and order were delicate and that an abrupt transition of power might “ruin the August consciousness” or create national disruption. Some international actors appeared persuaded by these arguments.

There were additional strategies at play that could be described as politically suicidal or as an attempt to manipulate power transitions. In the evenings, the advisers would hold meetings with two or three close associates. They gradually became so influential that Professor Yunus reportedly felt helpless at times and repeatedly altered decisions under pressure.

Regional power pressure and internal political calculations eventually compelled a shift toward an election-oriented stance. There was concern that if the election process became violent or chaotic, personal political capital would collapse, leaving key figures with nothing to show for their time in authority. The London meeting was considered part of the move toward elections. However, before that meeting, these advisers allegedly engaged in various conspiratorial discussions, arguing that such meetings would weaken Professor Yunus’s administration and send the wrong message to the public.

They also tried to activate their favored political forces to influence outcomes and fed selective feedback to Professor Yunus, placing him in a continuing dilemma. As a result, the election became increasingly uncertain.

Inside the country, a powerful faction continued to apply pressure in multiple ways. There appeared to be no viable alternative to holding elections, yet anti-election forces did not retreat. Gradually, they tightened their grip on the administration. At one stage, it seemed as if Professor Yunus might lose control entirely and that others would occupy the seat of power behind the scenes.

Observers closely monitoring mainstream political forces noted that most major parties consistently wanted elections. They did not publicly display rigid or extreme positions. However, repeated mob unrest slowed down administrative momentum. A review of incidents reported in Prothom Alo and The Daily Star on key dates suggests that on certain days of arson and violence, police response was unusually delayed. Questions arose about who instructed law enforcement not to act promptly. In several cases, police reportedly arrived at the scene very late, and the identity of certain senior police officials involved remained unclear.

Professor Yunus himself was reportedly kept in the dark about some of these developments. Later, a senior journalist quoted him as saying that he had been unaware of certain events at the time. The death of Osman Hadi had already generated significant discussion across the country, and some actors sought to exploit that opportunity. However, the army remained cautious, and political forces stayed active.

Analysis of social media suggested further indications of organized influence. These advisers were reportedly active not only domestically but also abroad, engaging in diplomatic circles and even traveling to South Asian countries. In one instance, an adviser allegedly disappeared for a day during a visit, and the Bangladesh mission was unable to immediately locate him. Public opinion surveys were also reportedly influenced, with many surveys commissioned that did not reflect reality.

The advisers were frequently present at embassies, telling foreign diplomats that unexpected political forces might rise in the election, citing opinion surveys as justification. Even on election day, they were reportedly active, closely monitoring results in specific constituencies. Reviews of certain seat outcomes revealed unusual patterns.

However, by evening it became clear that the situation was moving beyond their control. Any attempt to manipulate the election outcome carried serious risks. Ultimately, they refrained from implementing what some described as “Plan-B”.

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