The renewed activity of Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria has revived an old but unresolved question in Middle Eastern politics: how did an extremist Sunni jihadist organization and a revolutionary Shiite state come to intersect operationally in the same theaters of conflict? At first glance, the idea appears implausible. Al-Qaeda’s ideology is violently hostile to Shiism, while Iran has positioned itself as the protector of Shiite communities and the spearhead of resistance against Sunni extremism. Yet history repeatedly demonstrates that ideology often yields to strategy, and that adversaries can become functional partners when interests converge.

To understand this convergence, one must revisit the origins of Al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria and the regional upheavals that followed the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Al-Qaeda, originally forged in Afghanistan, was largely dismantled after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Under intense American pressure, its leadership scattered. Some members fled to Pakistan, others to Yemen and the Gulf, while a significant number quietly relocated to Iran. Despite Tehran’s public hostility toward Al-Qaeda, Iran allowed senior operatives to transit, reside, or remain under a form of controlled containment. This arrangement was neither ideological alignment nor coincidence; it was a calculated decision rooted in Iran’s broader regional strategy.

The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime marked a pivotal moment. Saddam was Iran’s most dangerous regional rival, and his removal represented a historic opportunity for Tehran. While Iran tacitly cooperated with Washington in facilitating the fall of Baghdad, it simultaneously worked to ensure that the........

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