The horse made the state
The horse made the state
Civilisation wasn’t made possible by grain, but by transportation – and the conquest it enabled, from the steppe to the sea
by Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene BIO
A horse rider at the market place in Urga (now Ulaanbaatar), Mongolia, photographed by Stéphane Passet in July 1913. Courtesy the Musée Albert-Kahn, France
is professor of history and anthropology at the National University of Mongolia. He is also a visiting scholar with the Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit (MIASU) at the University of Cambridge, UK. He is the author of The Taiji Government and the Rise of the Warrior State: The Formation of the Qing Imperial Constitution (2022) and The Nomadic Leviathan: A Critique of the Sinocentric Paradigm (2023).
Transportation is the backbone of civilisation, which is why controlling the Strait of Hormuz grants global leverage. Because oil fuels more than 90 per cent of global transit, the source of this power lies not in the waterway, but in the control of global mobility. Halting all oil supplies paralyses virtually all transport, communication and supply lines: cities collapse, states disintegrate, societies break down and populations die off, throwing humanity back to the pre-industrial age. Without transport animals, humanity would still be back in the Stone Age.
No city or state can exist without transportation, for there can be no concentration of population and resources. No transportation means no extrahuman transportation, leaving walking and carrying as the only means of transit. This baseline determined the size and structure of human communities. Production was limited to what could be carried home, circumscribing the areas where humans could settle and colonise. Production capacity and resource availability kept communities small, forcing them to split and disperse. Because size dictates structure, small meant undifferentiated and egalitarian. Ultimately, the inherent limit of the physical capability of travel and portage formed a natural immunity to inequality: it kept communities small, egalitarian and autonomous, leaving their lands beyond conquest.
As long as this constraint existed, communities resembled those of the Amazon Basin or the New Guinea Highlands. The domestication of animals and the invention of boats liberated humanity, making long-distance mobilisation possible. With this newfound capacity, communities no longer needed to fit their immediate environments; instead, they could build cities and integrate expansive areas – all roads lead to Rome. Transportation – not grain – is what brought the state and civilisation into existence, and what continues to maintain them. Let’s examine this power by looking from the present back to the origin of the state.
Contemporary live marine traffic map available at marinetraffic.com
Whoever rules the waves rules the world! Without its navy and air force, the United States cannot command global reach or project power worldwide. The same was true of European colonial empires; ultimately, warships and gunboats forged them. In earlier periods, Vikings built their empire on longships, Aztecs on canoes, Egyptians on riverboats, and Romans, Greeks and Phoenicians on galleys.
Conquering the world on horseback is easy, as the saying goes. On land, equids – donkeys and horses – forged states and civilisations, while the llama did the same for the Inkas. Ur’s kunga chariots project the military might of Mesopotamian cities, and the Abydos donkeys demonstrate their vital role in early Egyptian kingship. By the end of the 3rd millennium BCE, Central Eurasian nomads were entombing entire horse chariots – the high-tech, high-value war machines of their time – to honour their kings in Sintashta. Horse chariots later symbolised the power of the Shang and the Zhou; the latter deployed 4,000 chariots to overwhelm the former in 1046 BCE.
Building a state does not require grain, but does demand extrahuman transportation
‘The rider appears on the stage of history like a new breed of man’ – a centaur, as the German sociologist Alexander Rüstow put it in the 1950s. Eurasian nomads had long bred their mounts into the modern domestic horse, paving the way for an age of empires that would fundamentally reshape the world. Horses dominated human history for nearly four millennia. Even for maritime powers, horses remained key to conquest; from Carthage to the British, all relied on horses for inland expansion. Francisco Pizarro’s conquest of the Inkas is a prime illustration of the power of horses against an essentially pedestrian empire built on llama transportation. Horses also enabled the Comanche in North America to forge their empire and compete with European powers for nearly a century.
Comanche warriors, photographed in 1892. Courtesy Wikipedia
The Comanche Empire? Did they actually have grain to build a state? No, they had no grain – nor any agriculture, for that matter. Horse husbandry and bison hunting sustained their livelihood. In fact, all the Eurasian steppe powers – including the Mongols – relied on pastoralism. What they enjoyed most was an abundance of extrahuman transportation; what they lacked most was agricultural produce. Ultimately, building a state does not require grain, but it does demand extrahuman transportation.
Look at the political geography of the Roman and Mongol empires: the Romans could reach where ships could reach, and the Mongols could reach where horses could reach. The same is true of European colonial empires; it all comes down to the power of extrahuman transportation. Donkeys, horses and all other herd animals are the creations of pastoralists. Extrahuman transportation made the state and civilisation possible; this places pastoralism at the origin of the state and civilisation, and the Eurasian steppe at the centre of human history.
The expansion of the Mongol Empire in the 13th century. Courtesy Wikipedia
Yet the Sinocentric paradigm – the predominant vision of human history and civilisation with China at its centre – structurally erases extrahuman transportation and, with it, pastoralism, steppe empires and charisma from state formation, thereby negating the Eurasian steppe as the prime centre of human history. This framework shapes our current understanding of world history, leaving us with a view defined by entrapment, doom and despair. Becoming aware of this paradigm is essential if we are to break free from this bleak outlook, better comprehend the world we live in, and chart a brighter future.
While scholars critique world history for its Eurocentric bias, its conceptual framework and narrative are profoundly Sinocentric. This is because the origin of the state – and consequently the birth of civilisation – is the question that shapes our vision of world history. The latest authoritative iteration of this view is James C Scott’s Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (2017), along with his The Art of Not Being Governed (2009). ‘The Origin of the State: Land Productivity or Appropriability’ by Joram Mayshar and colleagues is its economic restatement. Scott, readers might counter, focuses almost exclusively on Mesopotamia and rarely mentions China. Yet his underlying framework actually rearticulates the paradigm established by the American Orientalist Owen Lattimore’s influential work, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940). Precisely for this reason, Scott not only frequently mentions ‘the loess soils along the Yellow River’, but also, directly quoting Lattimore, claims that ‘irrigation was spectacularly rewarding in the loess core of ancient China’.
A 1925 map of China and Mongolia by the George F Cram company, Chicago. Courtesy the David Rumsey Map Collection
Lattimore sought to legitimise the Republic of China’s claims over Mongolia, Manchukuo, Tibet and Eastern Turkestan. To this end, he advanced the grain thesis to locate the origins of statehood and civilisation in the Yellow River Valley, positioning China as the Cradle of the East. By mapping Frederick Jackson Turner’s American frontier thesis onto the region, Lattimore framed China as the civilised centre and reduced the aforementioned territories to ‘Inner Asia’ – a mere geohistorical frontier akin to the American West. In doing so, Lattimore abandoned the traditional conquest theory – a framework he had previously espoused – which held that both China’s early states and most of its subsequent empires were forged by Eurasian nomadic conquerors rather than indigenous dynamics. The rejection of the conquest theory was a repudiation of extrahuman transportation and pastoralism as forces that led to statehood, and an exaltation of sedentism and grain agriculture instead.
The paradigm owes its formation to Cold War politics and is at odds with archaeological evidence
The theory that entrenched Lattimore’s thesis in academia is Robert Carneiro’s circumscription hypothesis, published in the journal Science as ‘A Theory of the Origin of the State’ (1970). Not just conventional narratives, but a wide array of prominent thinkers – including Michael Mann, Jared Diamond, Francis Fukuyama and Yuval Noah Harari – popularised Carneiro’s theory in different guises. Even David Graeber and David Wengrow ultimately remain within this framework.
Drawing on Carneiro’s concept of circumscribed agricultural land, Mann’s The Sources of Social Power (1986) posits ecological and social cages with no ‘escape route’, while Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel (1997) similarly focuses on regions with ‘nowhere to flee’ to isolate the environmental conditions that generate the population pressure needed for the rise of the state. Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order (2011), however, is far more direct in delineating the primary conditions for pristine state formation: ‘that population needs to be physically constrained so that it increases in density’ and ‘that subjects cannot run away when coerced’. When Diamond wrote in Nature in 2002 that agricultural storable food surpluses ‘led to social stratification, political centralisation and standing armies’, he was merely rationalising the Lattimore-Carneiro population-pressure dogma as an ‘autocatalytic’ process. Harari’s Sapiens (2011), with its disease-ridden ‘luxury trap’, Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed, along with his Against the Grain, and Graeber and Wengrow’s lamentation that ours is a species ‘enslaved to its crops’ all ultimately stem from the same grain thesis.
Indeed, the Lattimore-Carneiro framework relied on a population-pressure model, arguing that agriculture and sedentism triggered overpopulation, forcing the creation of hierarchies and states. However, Carneiro’s circumscription thesis required areas such as Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley and the Peruvian coast to be entirely overcrowded. Instead, empirical settlement surveys revealed that these areas lacked the demographic density to exhaust arable land, with some even experiencing depopulation during early state-formation. Because no population pressure existed to catalyse state formation, archaeological findings invalidated Carneiro’s theory.
Scott’s novelty lies neither in his rhetoric of ‘political crops’, nor in his laser-focused ‘circumscribed ecological niches’ of ‘alluvial or loess soils’, but rather in his theoretical sleight of hand: dynamic climatic circumscription. His fertile alluvial or loess soils mirror Carneiro’s circumscribed agricultural land, though on a minuscule scale, engineered by a millennium-long drought rather than geographic barriers. Ultimately, Scott repurposes Carneiro’s model of resource concentration – a resource-rich habitat that draws people from surrounding regions – yet he supercharges it with the driving force of drought. In sum, drought – simultaneously reconfiguring the physical terrain into a localised cage and driving populations inward – enables Scott to isolate the minuscule, 250-hectare footprint of Uruk as the circumscribed agricultural land. Scott’s model here is a clever manoeuvre to salvage the Sinocentric paradigm. That paradigm, as we shall see, owes its formation to Cold War politics and is at odds with archaeological evidence.
Whether climatic or geographical, the agricultural cage is inherently an anti-mobility framing that structurally erases pastoralism from the formation of the state. This erasure is, however, not just a conceptual flaw; it is written into the paradigm’s DNA, as the framework is fundamentally built against mobility, and actively argues for its exclusion. The erasure takes the form of epistemic theft by way of attributing the authorship of domestication of livestock and pastoralism to farmers, delaying the date of the advent of pastoralism through hyper-restrictive definitions, and relying on exclusionary framing. While the initial framework was a politically motivated, instrumental scheme, subsequent models have resulted from paradigmatic biases.
The question that led to this erasive framing was not the origin of the state in general, but its emergence in what is now China – specifically, whether it was indigenous or born of nomadic conquest. This issue was linked to a raging political dilemma: did Manchuria, and by extension the Daiching Empire (also known as the Qing dynasty), constitute a Chinese or an Inner Asian empire? This debate was a political question concerning the definition of China and the delineation of its territory. Specifically, should China be defined as ‘China proper’, restricted to the Ming provinces, or as ‘China imperial’, encompassing the domains of the Daiching Empire.
The controversy escalated into a heightened political crisis with the declaration of Manchukuo. Japanese scholarship argued that the Daiching Empire was an Inner Asian state that had conquered China, and that the Manchus were a distinct people deserving independence. The Chinese nationalist regime and its scholarship countered, arguing that the empire was inherently Chinese, and that Manchuria had been an integral part of China since antiquity. Meanwhile, contemporary critical scholarship essentially agreed with the Japanese view; the dominant framework for the origins of the state in China was the invasion theory, which argued that early Chinese states, as well as many subsequent empires, were forged by Eurasian nomadic conquerors. Crucially, until then, Lattimore himself had been a proponent........
