I spent my career inside America’s nuclear enterprise, not only the command and control system, but the strategy and policy processes that kept the peace. I authored theater nuclear war plans, helped design tools for presidential nuclear decision-making, and served in the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon at the pinnacle of nuclear command and control, policy, strategy development, and war planning. I later ran for the U.S. Senate to champion peace through strength and support our current policies to re-establish it. 

Command and control is only one chapter of that history. Deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation are the others. If the dangers of uncontrolled nuclear weapons and uncontrolled artificial intelligence are comparable in the worst case, then policymakers should steal from the whole playbook, not just the briefcase. 

Command and control: who is allowed to act.

Nuclear policy concentrated authority, authenticated orders, and refused to let a machine, a single technician, or an unexplained process become the last word. That lesson travels. For the most dangerous AI systems, models that can design biological threats, run autonomous cyber campaigns, or trigger strategic effects, a named human must remain accountable. Decision support is a tool. Decision replacement is a surrender of sovereignty. Require audit trails, dual control where the harm is irreversible, rigorous testing before deployment, and the legal ability to shut a system down. “The model recommended it” is not a chain of command. 

Deterrence: make reckless racing unprofitable.

Nuclear peace did not come from wishing weapons away. It came from making the cost of a first strike, a surprise breakout, or a reckless........

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