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Three countries, no common enemy—why the Mecca defence pact is weaker than it looks

The Mecca defence pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan creates synergies that are not in India’s interest by and large, even if they do not impact India at the very outset.

Barely three days after Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the global commentariat is divided on what it is, what it is not and what it can never become.

The agreement declares that an armed attack against one will be regarded as an attack against all three. Reading it primarily as a collective-defence guarantee is the least useful way of understanding its implications.

Turkey already has the NATO cover. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has neither. It is also the largest Arab country, the biggest economy, the centre of Sunni Islam and, of the three partners, the one whose vulnerability has been exposed most relentlessly over the past five months. In fact, right after the signing of the pact, the Houthis’ strikes on Saudi met with no response from the tripartite agreement.

The Gulf has learned that buying American weapons and hosting US bases is not the same as having a guarantee from America that holds. Washington’s appetite for absorbing the costs of being the Gulf’s permanent security guarantor has visibly diminished. A sobering realisation now dawns: there is no going back to the status quo ante.

The Mecca pact is, therefore, principally about Saudi insecurity and its inability to protect itself and its interests. As a collective, it has a 3E gap.

But first, let’s deconstruct the headlines.

The biggest headline is that Pakistan has extended its nuclear umbrella to the Saudis. However, no public protocol establishes this. Pakistani officials previously walked back suggestions that nuclear weapons were covered even by the bilateral Saudi-Pakistani agreement signed last year.

Yet an ambiguity on the nuclear front has strategic value.

The UAE has moved considerably closer to Israel, an undeclared nuclear power, since the 2020 Abraham Accords. During this year’s war, Israel reportedly sent surveillance equipment, air-defence systems and an Iron Beam laser to help the UAE intercept Iranian missiles and drones. Israeli defence companies now maintain a continuing presence in the Emirates.

This does not amount to an Israeli nuclear guarantee to Abu Dhabi. Nor has Pakistan promised nuclear retaliation on behalf of Riyadh. Nevertheless, optics are part of deterrence and regional posturing.

If the Emiratis have Israel, Riyadh now has an answer in Turkey and Pakistan.

Beneath the surface, though, the collective-security claim—and especially its nuclear shadow—is a bluff that is hard to call, but equally hard to dismiss.

For now, the pact’s real challenge is the three Es— the questions of common enemy, economic challenges and efficiency – which has impeded clarity on its contours.

Also read: Pakistan orders Islamabad restaurants to go red and green to celebrate Saudi-Turkiye pact

Alliances work best when their members agree upon a common enemy. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey do not.

Pakistan’s principal military fixation remains India, and specifically Kashmir. Turkey’s immediate concerns include Kurdish armed groups in Syria, Israel and the eastern Mediterranean. Saudi Arabia must contend with Iran and the Houthis while simultaneously managing its growing........

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