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In my article in The Wire on Monday (April 13), I argued that women’s reservation in Lok Sabha can be implemented immediately – without waiting for a Census, without delimitation and without displacing a single Member of Parliament – by introducing a supplementary layer of proportional representation.

“Parliament can, through a focused constitutional amendment, increase the strength of the Lok Sabha by adding approximately 273 seats, as already decided by the Cabinet, and allocate these seats to political parties in proportion to their vote share in the 2024 general election. These additional seats can be reserved entirely for women.”

That argument addressed feasibility. The question now is acceptability.

There is understandable hesitation in some quarters about introducing proportional representation into a system that has, for decades, relied on first-past-the-post. Electoral systems acquire a certain inertia over time; they shape political behaviour, party structures and voter expectations. Any proposal that appears to alter this equilibrium, even partially, is bound to invite caution.

But hesitation, in the present case, rests on a misunderstanding.

The proposal is not to replace the existing system. It is not even to modify it in any permanent sense. It is to supplement it – temporarily – building a pragmatic bridge between a constitutional promise already made and its eventual full implementation, through the established route of Census and delimitation.

A transitional device, not a systemic shift

The supplementary seats proposed should, therefore, be seen for what they are: an interim constitutional device, not a structural redesign of India’s electoral architecture.

Delimitation, tied to the first census after 2026, is inevitable. But it is also time-consuming. The sequence – completion of the census, publication of data, constitution of the Delimitation Commission, redrawing of constituencies and final notification – has historically taken three to six years, if not longer.

This makes it unlikely that women’s reservation will take effect before 2034. That would mean asking women to wait not just the 26 years between the Bill’s first introduction and its passage in 2023, but another decade beyond that. There is no constitutional compulsion for such delay, and even less moral justification.

The supplementary mechanism offers a simple and elegant solution: deliver representation now, without disturbing the long-term framework. When delimitation is eventually carried out, these additional seats can be:

absorbed into an expanded Lok Sabha,

converted into territorial constituencies,

and reserved in accordance with the constitutional design then in force.

In that sense, the proposal is inherently self-lfimiting. It does not bind the future. It merely unlocks the present.

Most importantly, it need not ruffle any feathers. No party loses. No state loses. No sitting Member of Parliament is displaced. The existing electoral system remains fully intact. In a polity often wary of reform because of its distributive consequences, this is a rare instance of a measure that adds without subtracting.

Seat share or vote share: the interim choice

Even within this transitional framework, a design choice remains: how should these additional seats be allocated? Two alternative scenarios are examined in the tables below. The first examines the NDA versus INDIA seat shares and vote shares under a scenario where 273 additional seats are allocated. The second looks at how individual parties’ allocations would change depending on whether the 273 expansion is based on seat shares or vote shares.

Table 1: Seat Share vs Vote Share: A Snapshot (273 Additional Seats)

Table 2: All Parties’ Vote Share vs Seat Share

The contrast is revealing. Under vote-share allocation, representation aligns more closely with actual voter support. Smaller parties and dispersed voters – often under-represented in the current system – find a voice. Under seat-share allocation, by contrast, the existing balance of power is fully preserved, reflecting the logic of first-past-the-post.

Neither approach is without merit. Seat-share allocation offers political ease. It is minimally disruptive, mirrors the current composition of the House, and is therefore more likely to secure quick acceptance – particularly from those who benefit from the existing system.

But it also reproduces the well-known distortion of that system: the gap between votes secured and seats won.

Vote-share allocation, by contrast, offers democratic fidelity. It ensures that representation corresponds more closely to voter preference. It corrects, at least partially, the inequities that arise when large segments of the electorate remain under-represented despite significant support.

The choice, therefore, is not merely technical. It is strategic. If the priority is speed with minimal resistance, seat share may serve as a workable interim formula. If the priority is fairness even in transition, vote share is clearly superior.

What is important, however, is that this choice should not become a reason for inaction. Either route leads to the same destination: immediate implementation of women’s reservation.

The real risk is elsewhere

The more serious concern lies not in how seats are allocated, but in who is nominated to fill them. A list-based system, if left unregulated, can easily become an instrument of:

and the reproduction of entrenched hierarchies of caste, community or region.

In the absence of safeguards, supplementary seats could be captured by political families, loyalists or socially privileged groups, defeating the very purpose of the reform. The legitimacy of the proposal will ultimately depend not on its arithmetic, but on its integrity.

Guardrails for credible representation

A few minimum principles can ensure that the system serves its intended purpose.

Transparency must be foundational. Parties should disclose candidate details – background, qualifications, public record – so that selections are open to scrutiny. Structured internal processes must replace discretion. Candidate selection should be rule-based, whether through committees, consultative mechanisms or independent screening panels.

Anti-nepotism safeguards are essential. Disclosure of familial political relationships should be mandatory, and excessive concentration within political families discouraged. Social diversity must be consciously ensured. Lists should reflect India’s social composition – Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, minorities and regional diversity.

Merit and public service should guide inclusion. The reform offers an opportunity to bring into Parliament women with demonstrated contributions in fields such as law, education, public health, social work and governance. Candidates facing serious criminal charges should be excluded, in line with evolving electoral norms.

And most importantly, women nominated under this system must not be mere proxies. The reform must strengthen women’s agency, not replicate existing power structures under a different label.

Immediate action, structured future

A practical constraint must, however, be acknowledged.

If this reform is implemented within the life of the current Lok Sabha – as it should be – there will be no time for advance publication of party lists. In the immediate phase, therefore, minimum disclosure and diversity norms must suffice. But this cannot remain an ad hoc arrangement.

For the 2029 general election, a more robust institutional framework should be mandated, which will include:

pre-declared, ranked party lists,

public disclosure well in advance of elections,

and statutory guidelines to ensure transparency, diversity and internal democracy.

In other words, urgency must guide the present, but institutional design must secure the future.

A reform that disturbs no one, yet delivers for millions

This proposal is unusual in Indian politics. It does not take anything away from anyone. It does not disturb the federal balance. It does not reopen contentious debates. It simply adds what is missing. And it costs nothing.

Women’s representation can be ensured immediately, without waiting for processes that are uncertain in both timeline and outcome.

The choice, therefore, is not between reform and stability. It is between delay and delivery. Women have already waited long enough. They should not be asked to wait any longer – not for the Census, not for delimitation and not for procedural comfort.

S.Y. Quraishi is former Chief Election Commissioner of India and the author of An Undocumented Wonder – The Making of the Great Indian Election (2014).

Part 1 in this series was published on The Wire on April 13, and can be read here.

© The Wire