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Media reports the army has recently demolished two houses purportedly belonging to alleged perpetrators of the terror attack resulting in the death of a policeman on Amarnath yatra-securing duty in Kashmir. This is not the first time the army has deployed its resources to such effect in aid to civil authorities.

The last time was in the wake of the dastardly terror attack at the Baisaran meadow, when ten Kashmiri houses allegedly linked with terrorists were demolished. Three months later it turned out that the three Pakistani terrorists killed in Operation Mahadev were the perpetrators of that terror attack.

At the operational level, if the intent is retributive, clearly, the demolitions in wake of Baisaran were patently excessive, if not wholly arbitrary. Given that demolitions continue, the deterrent effect appears to be somewhat meager. At best useful for venting, such actions appear to have a political rationale.

Answering terror attacks with demolitions threatens to acquire policy imprimatur. Such insertion into the Indian counter insurgency play-book needs to be examined and, if called for, shot down timely.

Doing so is important, since there is now a negative two-way street between Kashmir and rest of India. Not only is there Kashmirisation of India, such as the recent letting-off of a pellet gun and a Kalashnikov on street protestors, but practices in the mainland – as demolitions – have been imported into Kashmir.

Controlled explosions

At the tactical level, the army is perhaps lending its combat engineer assets in an area – demolitions – where policing expertise is noticeably deficient. The amateur manner the confiscated explosive material in the Delhi blast case was handled after it was shifted to Kashmir shows the police requires a helping hand with explosives. However, the police’s expertise on demolishing without use of explosives is considerable. The use of explosives appears to be an egregious turn to the knife.

At the operational level, the army may believe that such collaboration shows cooperation between security forces. The underside of blind collaboration is that potentially all get tarred with the same brush. An uncalled-for bonhomie also leads up to mutual back-scratching, a force degrader.

At the strategic level, if the army is itself persuaded on the desirability of the tactic – that controlled explosions demolishing civilian property deters – then it needs to be disabused speedily. The demolition of houses........

© The Wire