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What Iran’s chemical weapons reveal about deterrence psychology

63 0
13.07.2026

Netanyahu’s Admission and the Strategic Puzzle It Creates

In a July 8, 2026 interview on Newsmax’s The Record with Greta Van Susteren, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Iran “definitely” possesses chemical weapons, calling it another threat Iran poses despite not having used CW during the recent US-Israel-Iran war during which much of the regime leadership was killed. This is not new intelligence so much as a headline-grade restatement of an assessment baseline that has existed publicly, and been periodically reaffirmed, for three decades. The Center for Strategic and International Studies — a nonpartisan Washington think tank founded in 1962 whose Middle East military-balance work, much of it authored by longtime defense analyst Anthony Cordesman, has been a standard reference for US and allied policymakers since the Cold War — has tracked Iran’s CW program since at least the 2009 publication of Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Iran’s chemical weapons capability

The Center for Strategic and International Studies — a nonpartisan Washington think tank whose Middle East military-balance work has been a standard policy reference since the Cold War — has tracked Iran’s chemical weapons program since a dedicated 2009 study, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction. Its assessment: Iran remains a declared chemical weapons power, built on a CIA finding dating to 1997 that Iran had manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents along with the means to deliver them. The State Department formally found Iran non-compliant with the Chemical Weapons Convention as recently as 2019.

Nerve agents are a longer-running concern. German intelligence assessed in 2005 that Iran probably possessed sulfur mustard, tabun, and hydrogen cyanide, and may possess sarin and VX — a judgment consistent with a documented 1990s procurement trail, including reported Indian assistance equipping an Iranian sarin/tabun-capable facility and a US-prosecuted 1997 case involving an attempted shipment of VX/sarin precursor chemicals to Iran.

Iran’s technical mastery here is corroborated by its own record as a proliferator. By the mid-2000s, Iran was supplying Syria’s chemical weapons program with facility blueprints and precursor chemicals for VX and sarin production — including a documented 2002 transfer of ten tons of a VX/mustard precursor — and was reportedly the program’s primary funder, even covering North Korean technical assistance to Damascus. Syria’s resulting arsenal, some 1,300 metric tons of sarin, VX, and mustard agent, was built in........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)