Donald Trump’s Board of Peace debuted with the staging of a fully formed international institution: formal ceremony, assembled leaders, and a sweeping presidential promise to rebuild Gaza and reshape global diplomacy. Strip away the optics, however, and the launch revealed something far more fragile — an entity without binding financing, without broad legitimacy, and without a governance structure calibrated to attract either.

The Board is not yet a reconstruction mechanism. It is a political initiative resting on pledges that are reversible, appropriations that do not exist, and support that remains largely observational. In every meaningful sense, the check is still in the mail.

The $10 Billion That Is Not There

At the inaugural meeting, Trump announced a $10 billion US commitment to Gaza’s reconstruction, presenting it as the anchor of a decade-long plan. Within hours, administration officials clarified that the pledge is contingent on congressional approval and subject to annual appropriations.

Under US law, foreign assistance cannot be obligated absent congressional authorization and appropriated funds. No such legislation exists. Congress has not been formally consulted, and no request has been advanced through the appropriations process. The president can signal intent; he cannot commit Treasury funds unilaterally.

The $10 billion figure is therefore not an operative financial commitment. It is a policy aspiration without statutory force.

Congressional reaction underscores the point. Senator Ed Markey publicly questioned whether the Board is designed to supplant existing multilateral institutions and demanded clarity regarding statutory compliance. Republican leadership has offered no concrete endorsement. The House — where foreign aid skepticism is strongest — has not engaged. Until Congress acts, the largest number attached to the Board remains non-appropriated and non-binding.

The Funding Gap as Signal

Gaza’s reconstruction is estimated at approximately $53 billion by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union. The Board’s launch generated roughly $6.5 billion in pledges — barely 12 percent of estimated requirements, and that figure assumes all pledges materialize.

The Gulf states — the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar — each pledged roughly $1 billion. For sovereigns with vast reserves and a record of underwriting regional initiatives at substantially higher levels when strategically invested, these are modest sums. They meet the diplomatic minimum necessary to avoid accusations of indifference while limiting exposure to an institution whose durability and legitimacy remain uncertain.

Historically, when Gulf states view an initiative as strategically indispensable, their commitments scale dramatically higher and are structured for visible deployment. Here, the pledges appear calibrated to preserve optionality. They can be delayed, conditioned, or quietly withdrawn. They keep the states in the room without tying them to the project’s outcome.

The shortfall — more than $40 billion — is not merely a technical gap. It reflects the underlying confidence level of major contributors. The Board launches without the financial weight that would signal strategic conviction.

The World Bank Guardrail — and Its Limits

The World Bank’s role as custodian provides the initiative’s most credible institutional feature. President Ajay Banga announced that the Bank will hold and disburse funds in accordance with fiduciary standards, reducing risks of diversion or mismanagement.

That procedural safeguard matters. But it does not resolve the core structural issue.

The Bank will not set priorities or determine beneficiaries; it will execute decisions made by the Board. Governance authority remains concentrated in a body chaired by Trump, reportedly with veto authority and succession control embedded in its founding structure. Fiduciary oversight mitigates operational risk. It does not neutralize the perception of personalist control.

For many states, that distinction is decisive.

The Legitimacy Deficit

If the funding picture is thin, the legitimacy picture is thinner.

Hungary and Bulgaria are the only European Union members to formally join. Major European states — including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Austria, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland — attended as observers but declined membership. Several have indicated they will not join.

A European diplomat summarized the concern: most governments are unwilling to commit to an ill-defined institution led indefinitely by a single political figure and positioned in ambiguous relation to existing multilateral structures.

Observer status preserves engagement while withholding endorsement. It is a hedge, not a vote of confidence.

The legitimacy gap is most acute with respect to Palestinians themselves.

Only one Palestinian technocrat addressed the launch. No representatives of Palestinian political factions, civil society, municipal leadership, or community organizations participated in shaping the Board’s structure. A reconstruction mechanism without embedded Palestinian ownership faces inherent credibility constraints.

Reconstruction is not only financial; it is political and social. External administration absent internal legitimacy risks being perceived as management rather than partnership.

Optics and Perception

Israel’s visible presence at the launch, including presentations by Israeli business figures proposing large-scale commercial redevelopment concepts, further complicates perceptions. However forward-looking those proposals may be, they reinforce concerns among skeptics that the Board risks projecting external visions onto Gaza rather than facilitating locally anchored recovery.

Perception does not determine success — but in post-conflict reconstruction, it conditions participation.

Structure vs. Performance

The Board of Peace begins operations with approximately 10–15 percent of estimated funding, limited major-power membership, and a governance model that concentrates authority in ways that deter broad institutional buy-in. Its largest announced contribution is not yet authorized. Its most significant pledges are calibrated for reversibility. Its principal multilateral partner provides fiduciary safeguards but not political legitimacy.

It may evolve. Congress could appropriate funds. Gulf states could scale commitments. Governance provisions could be revised. Those pathways remain open.

But as launched, the Board rests more on announcement than obligation, more on presence than participation, and more on aspiration than appropriation.

The check is in the mail. Whether it is ever written, funded, and cleared will determine whether the Board becomes a reconstruction mechanism — or remains a political stage.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)