Prior to the bloody attacks of October 7, the political consensus prevailing in Israel and Western capitals regarding the Islamic Republic’s behavior rested on a deeply flawed assumption: the logic of “neither war nor peace.” Under this doctrine, policymakers believed that by maintaining an Israeli defensive posture, relying on intelligence superiority, and managing localized conflicts with proxies near the border, they could effectively contain and neutralize Tehran’s threats. However, October 7 was not merely a terrorist attack; it marked the total collapse of this paradigm. In shock and disbelief, Israel and Western governments realized that the chant “Death to Israel” is not just cheap political propaganda peddled by a few aging Ayatollahs. Rather, the core of the Islamic Republic’s political theology is built entirely around putting this slogan into practice.

​In the wake of this disaster, it seems Israel finally recognized the futility of its “Defensive Posture” strategy. Jerusalem’s security doctrine shifted—belatedly but accurately—toward an offensive approach targeting the root source of the threat.

While Israel’s strikes against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and military facilities during the twelve-day war (aided by US military support) were critical, the stark reality remains: as long as the political will to annihilate Israel survives in Tehran, the Jewish people will lack true security. Israel’s intelligence mastery inside Iran proved highly effective in decapitating the IRGC’s terrorist leadership, but tactical wins do not replace strategic certainty.

​At this critical historical juncture, with speculation mounting over imminent US military action against Iran, Israel must find a reliable answer to a pressing question: in the “day after the Islamic Republic,” what kind of structure will not threaten our existence? Looking at the current US administration’s policies toward Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba, Washington seems to favor regime change models that place hope in internal government factions. For Israel, applying this model to Iran represents a severe potential danger.

Entire apparatus of the Islamic Republic—whether reformist or hardliner—is completely unified and active in its hostility toward Israel and the West. No faction within this system can ever serve as a reliable security partner. But an even greater danger lies in alternative scenarios that have escaped rigorous scrutiny due to media hype.

​Certain Western factions and Iran’s centralist opposition, leaning on media-manufactured nostalgia, advocate for the return of a “powerful central government” (such as a monarchy). Israeli security analysts must remain highly vigilant here: a strong central state that takes power without the total dismantling of the current military apparatus—specifically the IRGC—represents merely a cosmetic alteration of the threat. If a military machine that has relentlessly practiced antisemitism for five decades forms the backbone of Iran’s future army—a scenario made plausible by Reza Pahlavi’s repeated emphasis on his connections with Iran’s current military body—anti-Israeli policies will simply persist, taking on new and more sophisticated dimensions.

Moreover, to consolidate power and ensure its survival, any newly formed authoritarian central government would inevitably resort to suppressing the country’s diverse nations (Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and Turks). This guarantees the reproduction of a vicious cycle of instability, internal military conflicts, and security vacuums—creating the perfect breeding ground for radical Islamic groups similar to Hezbollah or new iterations of Hamas.

Ultimately, Israel’s sustainable existence and security do not depend on a powerful Tehran, but rather on establishing a “Balance of Power” through decentralization. In this complex security puzzle, the Kurds are the golden key.

Relying on 80 years of organized struggle and well-established grassroots political parties, the Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan (Iran) are the only force capable of effectively managing and securing the region during a transitional period. Israeli support for the establishment of an autonomous structure similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq within Iranian Kurdistan would effectively create a “Security Buffer.”

Meanwhile, Turkey—driven by Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions and its blatant support for Hamas and jihadist groups in Syria—has proven itself to be a serious threat to Israeli interests. Should the Islamic Republic collapse, Turkey will undoubtedly rush to exploit the ensuing power vacuum to expand its own military and political footprint in Iran. The presence of a strong, autonomous Kurdistan in Iran would act as an impenetrable barrier against Turkey’s expansionist goals. Under these circumstances, backing the Kurds transforms from an option into an absolute geopolitical necessity.

​The relationship between Jews and Kurds must move past the cliché of being “natural allies” and be elevated to the status of “Trusted Allies.” Unlike many regional actors, the Kurds have consistently demonstrated a genuine, practical commitment to Western values, democracy, and pluralism. The Peshmerga’s relentless fight against ISIS and jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria serves as clear proof that the Kurds are the frontline defense against radical Islamism.

​David Ben-Gurion’s Doctrine of the Periphery belonged to the 20th century. To guarantee its security in the 21st century, Israel requires a new strategic doctrine: one that recognizes a free, secular Kurdistan in Iran not merely as a moral aspiration, but as a strategic necessity for the survival of the Jewish state and the broader stability of the Middle East.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)