Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s remarks were domestic politics, not government strategy. The EU is Israel’s main trade partner and a decisive regulatory arena, yet parts of Europe still treat Israel as a detached normative file, while Israel sometimes confuses headlines with EU decision making. Greenland exposed a transactional American pattern. Against that backdrop, Israel keeps a quiet European track: deep working level coordination with Brussels, not instead of Washington, but as insurance against volatility.

Last week, Israel’s Justice Minister, Yariv Levin, chose the European Union as a domestic political target. In a court filing connected to a High Court petition, he accused the EU of “working to topple the elected government” and of funding protests against it. His privately retained lawyer, Yoram Sheftel, went further in open court, branding the EU “hostile” and alleging that certain European states imposed embargoes to prevent Israel from prevailing in a war of survival.

This was not Israeli foreign policy. It was not a strategic briefing. It was a primary season shot fired outward, aimed inward.

The European Union is not an ideological camp. It is not a “group of left wing countries”. It is the world’s largest integrated market, Israel’s largest trading partner, and the regulatory environment that determines which industries can scale and which cannot. Over a third of Israel’s imports originate in the EU. Roughly a third of Israeli exports are directed there. Hundreds of Israeli companies rely on access to this market. This is not a symbolic relationship. It is a component of Israel’s economic national security.

Israel is also among the most deeply connected non European countries to European systems, almost at the level of nerve endings. Aviation access operates within an EU Israel framework. Industrial standards, financial regulation, research platforms, infrastructure protection, civilian cyber architecture and energy interfaces are structurally intertwined. These are not diplomatic courtesies. They are operating systems.

Both sides function within a permanent gap: political noise repeatedly displaces substance.

In parts of Europe, Israel is increasingly read as a “normative file” detached from context: a country judged primarily through declarative standards, not through the daily mechanics of a frontline democracy living in direct contact with terrorist organisations and state sponsors of terror, in an arena where error is paid in blood. Pressure that does not understand Israeli political mechanics often strengthens the most suspicious camp inside Israel and pushes decisions further from resolution.

At the same time, a mirror illusion persists in Jerusalem: that Israel depends on Europe alone. In reality, Europe also relies on Israel in operational assets it does not casually replace: technology, cyber capability, intelligence interfaces, infrastructure resilience, energy options and security know how. Framing Israel as “problematic” erases a European interest.

The adversaries are shared: terrorism, radicalisation, hostile finance, cognitive penetration, the erosion of borders. Whoever defines this as a local theatre will eventually encounter the blowback at home.

European criticism of Israel sometimes slips into double standards and, at times, into collective insinuation toward Jews. Yet Jerusalem must also maintain discipline: not every criticism is antisemitism, even when it is sharp, even when it is political. Blurring that distinction weakens the struggle against genuine antisemitism and damages credibility. Most of Europe seeks serious, purposeful dialogue, not a war of slogans.

Israel also misreads the Union when it confuses headlines with mechanism. Spain declared. Ireland protested. Belgium condemned. The conclusion becomes: “Europe is against us”. This is a category error.

The Union is a power mechanism: Commission, Council and Parliament, each with distinct competences. Different voting rules. Changing coalitions. Qualified majorities in some files, unanimity in others. Rhetoric does not bind. Decisions bind.

Brussels matters to Israel in a reality where Washington increasingly measures alliances in transactions.

Greenland exposed the Trump pattern: sovereignty treated as a function of interest, alliance valid so long as alignment persists, and those who diverge pay a price. Not promises, instruments. Not enduring commitments, daily overlap of interests.

Jerusalem registered the conclusion: if this is how Copenhagen is treated when pressure is useful, this is how Jerusalem will be treated when interests diverge. Personal rapport with Trump is not an anchor. It is conditional. When the sovereignty of an ally becomes a bargaining clause, every asset is exposed. Today an island. Tomorrow a theatre.

From here derives Israel’s interest in the Danish position. If a Western ally can be pressured without cost, that becomes a method. Others will test it against Israel. Time itself becomes a tradable variable.

Publicly, Jerusalem maintained silence around Greenland. There is no gain in confrontation, but neutrality is not an option. At working levels, Israel has aligned with the Danish and European position: coordination, boundary marking, friction management.

At the same time, deep coordination between Jerusalem and Brussels continues, both politically and, even more so, at professional levels, across multiple domains. It is not party dependent. In several operational theatres it has proven more stable than the Washington line: less personal, less volatile, more institutional, and therefore outcome producing.

Beneath the radar, Israel is building quiet synchronisation with European capitals regarding volatility in Washington. Not against the United States, but against unpredictability: scenario planning, red lines, response alignment and mutual insurance for the day Washington changes direction mid course.

Israel does not build strategy on a single variable. Even in difficult periods, it does not replace Brussels with Washington. Europe needs Israel to remain a serious actor.

This essay is adapted from a Hebrew column published in Maariv on February 23, 2026, under the title “ישראל לא יכולה להרשות לעצמה להתבלבל לגבי אירופה”.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)