From Nairobi to Bab-El-Mandeb: Somaliland and the Emerging Counter-Alignment.
President Irro’s diplomatic outreach now intersects with a widening maritime-security network connecting Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and Cyprus. The convergence is real – but it has not yet become a formal counter-pact.
HARGEISA – The distance between Nairobi and the Strait of Bab-El-Mandeb is geographical. For Somaliland, however, it increasingly represents a single geopolitical journey: from campaigning for diplomatic access in Kenya to positioning itself inside the emerging security architecture of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Eastern Mediterranean.
When President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro returned to Hargeisa on August 15, 2026, after completing his second, week-long working visit to Nairobi, the significance extended beyond Somaliland’s renewed access to Kenya’s diplomatic hub.
During meetings with diplomats, international organisations and development partners, Irro presented a sharper proposition: Somaliland seeks investment, technology, expertise and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than continued dependence on traditional foreign aid.
The visit marked a progression from the diplomatic foothold established during his first Nairobi mission in 2025 toward more confident economic and strategic engagement—demonstrating Hargeisa’s ability to deepen practical international relationships even where formal recognition remains disputed.
Nairobi was therefore not recognition. It was something more preliminary but strategically important: diplomatic access without formal status.
The journey from Nairobi to Bab-EL-Mandeb describes how that access is being converted into strategic relevance. Somaliland is no longer presenting itself solely as an unrecognised democracy seeking justice. It is increasingly offering itself as a maritime-security partner positioned beside one of the world’s most consequential maritime chokepoints.
That shift has accelerated following the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement and the continuing military pressures around Bab-El-Mandeb, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
The Makkah Pact changes the calculation
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a Joint Defence Agreement in Makkah. Its central provision declares that an armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all three.
The agreement brings together Saudi financial and religious influence, Turkey’s military-industrial capacity and Pakistan’s status as the Muslim world’s only nuclear-armed state. The three governments insist that the arrangement is defensive and directed against no specific country. Nevertheless, its geopolitical weight cannot be dismissed.
Subsequent announcements indicate that the three states intend to create political and military coordination mechanisms, conduct joint land, naval, air and cyber exercises, and cooperate in drones, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and defence production. These plans move the agreement beyond diplomatic symbolism, although no integrated command structure, activation procedure or explicit nuclear guarantee has yet been disclosed.
The Makkah Pact should not yet be described as a Middle Eastern NATO. Its members have different relationships with Iran, Israel, the United States and the Gulf monarchies. Their threat perceptions overlap, but they are not identical.
Nor is the agreement explicitly directed against Somaliland. Its relevance for Hargeisa arises primarily from Turkey’s position: Ankara rejects Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and remains a major........
