Somaliland’s latest debate over freedom of speech, journalist arrests and government authority has reopened one of the most important questions facing its young democracy: how far should free expression extend, and where should legitimate legal limits begin?

A year ago, I argued that a freer voice means a stronger Somaliland. That position has not changed, but the latest controversy shows why the principle must be stated more precisely. Freedom of expression is broad and indispensable, yet it is not a licence for defamation, incitement or genuine threats; equally, those exceptions are not a licence for government to punish speech merely because it is harsh, insulting or politically inconvenient. The real democratic test is whether Somaliland can draw those lines through clear law, independent courts and due process rather than through political instinct or the coercive power of the state.

That test is now before the country in the detention of journalist Abdiqani Hussein Abokor, known as Baylood, and poet Ismail Yusuf Abdi, known as Jiheeye. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Jiheeye appeared in an August 27 interview complaining that two plots of land had been taken and recited a poem warning that President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro would face a curse if he did not intervene. CPJ reports that Jiheeye was arrested on August 28 and Abdiqani on August 29, after the journalist responded to a Criminal Investigation Department summons. As of CPJ’s September 7 report, Abdiqani had not been formally charged, and CPJ said requests for comment to the presidency, information ministry and police had received no response.

Source: CPJ, 7 September 2026

Those facts should be treated carefully. The poet’s land claim is an allegation that should be investigated, not accepted as established fact, and the government may possess information or evidence that has not yet been made public. The same caution applies to the poem itself: describing it automatically as a criminal threat would prejudge a legal question that depends on the precise words, context, intention and applicable law. A democratic system should be capable of examining both the alleged property grievance and the contested speech without converting either political anger or public sympathy into a substitute for adjudication.

The Constitution Protects Speech—and It Also Protects Property

The first point is constitutional. Article 32 of the Somaliland Constitution protects expression and the freedom of the press and other media, placing public criticism within the architecture of Somaliland’s democratic order. Article 31, in the same Constitution, protects private property and addresses expropriation for public purposes and compensation. That means the current controversy is not only about what a poet said or what a journalist broadcast; it also began with an allegation that a citizen exhausted government channels while seeking redress for property he says was taken without compensation.

Source: Somaliland Constitution, Articles 31–32

If the property was lawfully acquired for a public purpose and compensation was properly handled, government should be able to demonstrate that through records and a transparent process. If compensation remains legally due, the grievance should be resolved rather than allowed to harden into a political confrontation. If the claimant is wrong, an accessible court or administrative mechanism should say so and explain why. Good governance is not simply the power to enforce an order; it is the capacity to give a citizen a lawful answer before frustration is pushed into the street, the media or the poetic tradition.

Free Speech Has Limits, but Government Must Prove the Limit

The phrase “free speech is not absolute” is correct, but it is often used too casually. Every serious legal system recognizes circumstances in which expression may be restricted, including carefully defined forms of defamation, direct incitement, genuine threats, or disclosure that creates a specific and lawful national-security harm. The decisive question is not whether restrictions can exist, but whether the restriction in a particular case is prescribed by law, directed at a legitimate harm, necessary, and proportionate. Without those disciplines, the phrase “free speech is not absolute” can become an empty justification for almost any official response.

International human-rights jurisprudence provides a useful benchmark for that distinction. The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 on freedom of expression emphasizes that political speech concerning public figures receives especially high protection and that the mere fact that expression is insulting to a public official is not enough to justify punishment. It also warns that defamation laws should not be used to stifle expression and that criminal penalties should be........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)