Why Berbera fits America’s changing Red Sea posture 

Missile threats and disrupted shipping are pushing the United States to spread its operations across several sites. Somaliland can become one reliable part of that network—if Hargeisa puts the right security, legal and commercial foundations in place. 

The main question about Berbera is not whether it can host another large foreign base. It is whether the port and airfield can work as part of a wider network that keeps running when a runway comes under threat, a chokepoint becomes dangerous or a host government limits access. 

This is very important because relying on one large base for every regional crisis is becoming more dangerous. Recent missile and drone attacks in the Gulf have made an existing debate in U.S. military planning more urgent. Forces are more likely to survive if they are spread out, mobile, supplied in advance and able to move between several locations. 

Berbera should be judged in this way. It should not be sold as a replacement for Djibouti or as a launch site for an undefined war across the Red Sea. Its most realistic value is as a backup for maritime surveillance, logistics, refuelling, search and rescue, emergency access and the protection of commercial infrastructure on the African side of Bab el-Mandeb. 

The fortress model meets the precision-strike era 

Large bases still have an important role. They offer command centres, maintenance, stockpiles, medical care and secure communications that smaller sites cannot easily match. But their size and fixed location also make them attractive targets. A large hub can be defended, but it cannot be hidden. 

The U.S. Air Force created its Agile Combat Employment concept to deal with this problem. It calls for forces sized for a specific mission to move between different locations, with supplies placed there in advance and agreements with host countries. The Marine Corps follows a similar approach through Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. It uses small, mobile forces that are harder to detect and can operate from temporary or basic sites to support sea control and keep units supplied. 

These ideas were mainly designed for the Indo-Pacific, but they also fit the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The risks are similar: too few known bases, exposed supply lines and heavy dependence on politically sensitive chokepoints. A distributed network does not replace the main base. It makes sure the whole system does not fail if that base is hit or closed. 

“Berbera’s strongest case is not that it can replace Djibouti. It is that a strong maritime network should not depend on only one hub on the African coast.” 

Why Berbera belongs in the network 

Berbera’s location is its starting point, but location alone is not enough. The port sits on the Gulf of Aden, close to Bab el-Mandeb and the shipping lanes linking the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Suez Canal. Its infrastructure adds to that value. DP World reports a 400-metre quay, a 17-metre draft, three ship-to-shore cranes and capacity for 500,000 containers a year. A planned second phase would raise capacity to two million. The nearby Berbera Economic Zone is also being built along the trade corridor to Ethiopia. 

Berbera also combines a port and an airfield. Any distributed site must be able to move people and supplies by sea, air and land. It also needs fuel, storage, power, communications and protection. Berbera has the basic shape of such a site, but it has not yet publicly shown that it can support long military operations. Closing that gap is the real work ahead. Hargeisa should not claim that Berbera is already fully ready. 

U.S. officials have shown serious interest but have not announced a basing decision. In June and November 2025, senior U.S. Africa Command delegations visited Somaliland and toured Berbera’s port and airfield. They assessed the site’s operational capacity and security. These visits show that Washington is studying Berbera. They do not prove a secret deal or make a U.S. deployment certain. Somaliland’s case will be stronger if it keeps that distinction clear. 

Complement Djibouti—do not pretend to replace it 

The Congressional Research Service describes Camp Lemonnier as the only long-term U.S. military base in Africa. Djibouti has command, aviation, intelligence, logistics and partner networks built over more than twenty years. Berbera cannot recreate that system quickly, and Somaliland should not claim that it can. 

The stronger case is that Berbera can support Djibouti. Djibouti’s importance has brought American, Chinese, French, Japanese and other foreign facilities into a small area. China’s base is also close to Camp Lemonnier. This creates several risks. The area is crowded, foreign powers can watch each other closely, the host government has leverage, and many missions depend on access to one country. 

An access agreement for Berbera could spread out selected tasks without building another huge permanent base. Djibouti would remain the main base. Berbera could serve as a backup for diverted aircraft, fuel, logistics, maritime awareness, humanitarian response and occasional........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)