The Prime Ministerial tenure of Andy Burnham was not 24 hours old before the report came that he would allow American use of United Kingdom bases – most crucially in Diego Garcia – for “defensive” strikes on Iran. The qualifier is so expansive as to be meaningless except in the realm of legal technicality: the United States’s war against the Islamic Republic rests in no small part upon British goodwill. It is not, of course, the first time that Britain has lent its capabilities to war in the Middle East in which the Americans are involved. The Royal Air Force was active in downing Iranian drones sent against Israel and Qatar, at the least, at various points in 2024, 2025, and 2026. The RAF joined the United States Navy in strikes on Yemeni positions in spring 2025. And the RAF flew intelligence-gathering missions over Gaza to aid in the search for hostages there. 

One may or may not agree with overall British policy on the Iran war specifically – I happen to believe that it is in Britain’s interest to participate – but it is simply an empirical fact that Britain has largely been supportive of America’s wars in the past few decades. Keep this in mind. 

The Argentinian record is considerably less robust. Argentina lent four naval vessels to the 1991 war with Iraq, and it has lent rhetorical support to the 2026 war with Iran. Thus ends the record. 

America has forgotten how to do statecraft

America has forgotten how to do statecraft

This observation is, on its face, somewhat unfair to Argentina, which does not have a relationship with the United States to parallel the long-running Anglo-American concord, and certainly does not have meaningful strategic interests anywhere in which America goes to war. Americans ought not penalize Argentina for possessing a different history and different imperatives than America and Britain. Yet it is an observation that must be made, not for the purpose of diminishing Argentina, but for illuminating a unique strand of geostrategic error that has wormed its way into American civic discourse. 

That error is the belief that the United States ought to recognize the Falkland Islands – British possessions inhabited by British citizens for longer than the United States has possessed Texas – as part of Argentina. The world was unsurprised by the banner unfurled by the Argentinian team after its defeat of England in the World Cup semifinal. What was surprising was that a handful of Americans also claimed that “Las Malvinas son Argentinas.” 

This discourse, such as it is, has come about thanks to a handful individuals on X, although it is not entirely exclusive to them. Most prominent is Marc Zell, the Chairman of Republicans Overseas Israel, who believes the United States should recognize the “Malvinas” as Argentinian in retaliation for British refusal to directly participate in the Iranian war. The sentiment was accompanied by several signals: among them a Reuters report, published April 24, alleging the existence of a Department of War memorandum which contemplated “punishing” Britain for its Iran war stance with a recognition of the Falklands as Argentinian. Whether or not the memorandum was real – and even if it was, speculative options are not policy – the reality is that for a minority of the American right, suddenly, an........

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