How Will China’s DF-27 Long-Range Missile Reshape the Pacific?
All respect to my colleague and friend Professor Andrew Erickson, but China’s DF-27 antiship ballistic missile does not represent “a new form of naval force,” as he wrote in USNI News last month. It is intimately familiar, and more ominous for all that. It represents the latest in a centuries-old form of naval force approaching its apex potential thanks to advances in sensor, computer, and weapons technology backed by the willpower and resources of a prosperous, ambitious, and increasingly domineering maritime power. Everything old is new again.
That being the case, it’s worth looking back in time to peer through the sea of fog that obscures the future of martial affairs.
Prompting Andrew’s commentary is the Pentagon’s recently-released annual report to Congress detailing Chinese military progress. The DF-27, the latest in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) family of precision, ultra-long-range munitions for pummeling enemy warships, has put in an appearance in the past few China reports. But past references have been vague, and are even more so this time around. In this report, the missile appears precisely once, on a map depicting the ranges of various missiles fired from Chinese territory. (Scroll down to page 85.) The Pentagon’s new map matter-of-factly shows the DF-27, with an estimated upper range of 8,000 kilometers, or just under 5,000 statute miles, overshadowing much of the Indo-Pacific theater—including much of the US West Coast. Judging from the imagery, the US Third Fleet hub at San Diego appears to lie out of reach. But other critical Navy installations, such as Everett, Washington and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, lie well within DF-27 range, if the report has things right.
Three quick observations. First, the report’s framers may be deliberately softpedaling the missile’s capability. Why they would do so is a mystery, but a few plausible candidate explanations come to mind. Politics is one. Of late the Trump administration has swerved toward nurturing more cordial relations with Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party leadership. That being the case, Washington may not want to draw attention to PLA weaponry apt to alarm the American populace, their elected representatives, or allies, partners, and friends, lest the new charm offensive founder on the rocky crags of popular opinion. The White House’s wishes shape what the Pentagon, a political implement, does—including setting the tone for official reports pertaining to martial and diplomatic affairs.
From a military standpoint, the Pentagon may also see grounds for confidence despite the DF-27’s debut. For one thing, there is a difference between the maximum firing range of a weapon and its maximum effective firing range. (Trust me.) The former typically exceeds the latter, sometimes by a considerable margin. It may be that US intelligence analysts judge that the DF-27 could prove deadly to shipping closer to China, but far less effective at the outermost ranges portrayed on the Pentagon’s map. If so, US naval bases in the Eastern Pacific may not have come under serious direct threat as of yet. If........
