As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrives in Ottawa this week, Canada is attempting what Prime Minister Mark Carney has described as a “reset” with China — an effort to stabilize a relationship strained by disputes over technology, human rights, election interference allegations and Taiwan. For Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, this moment is instructive.

Canada’s rapprochement follows Carney’s Davos speech in January 2025 saying there’s been a “rupture” in the rules-based international order as the world’s great powers — most notably the U.S., China and Russia — abandoned it to pursue their own narrow national interests. Yi’s visit comes despite fresh public warnings from China’s ambassador cautioning Canadian parliamentarians against visiting Taiwan. Engagement is proceeding even as Beijing reiterates its red lines.

Japan shares some of Canada’s structural realities. It has deep economic interdependence with China and exposure to economic coercion, including the weaponization of supply chains, rare earths and, most recently, tourism. But Tokyo’s strategic environment is more acute. Japan sits astride key sea lanes of communication, hosts major U.S. bases and would be directly affected by any Taiwan contingency — code for a conflict, blockade or other military incident involving Taiwan and mainland China.

Unlike Canada, Japan cannot treat Taiwan as a distant diplomatic abstraction. Geography alone prevents that, as does Taiwan’s central role in semiconductor supply chains and its place in the First Island Chain. This chain stretches from the Northern Territories to the Philippines — a defensive perimeter that, if controlled, could keep China’s adversaries out of the Indo-Pacific through the positioning of naval, submarine and missile systems.

The question for Tokyo is not whether to engage China. It must. The question is how to sustain engagement while reinforcing deterrence and reducing vulnerability.

Recent events illustrate both the possibilities and limits of........

© The Japan Times