The escalating confrontation between the US/Israel, and Iran has largely taken away the limelight and international attention from the unfolding Pak-Afghan tensions. Yet beneath this shifting geopolitical spotlight, both the Pakistani state and the Afghan Taliban regime are confronting substantial challenges in achieving their respective objectives.

For the Taliban leadership, the struggle is unfolding on multiple fronts. Militarily, the regime appears intent on transforming the theatre of conflict from a conventional confrontation to a sub-conventional one, an arena where it historically enjoys a tactical advantage. Guerrilla warfare, asymmetric strikes, and ideological mobilisation have long been the Taliban’s operational strengths, though on a different turf. It is within this strategic context that the differences in approach between figures such as Mullah Yaqoob and Sirajuddin Haqqani become evident. Their competing visions reflect an internal debate over how the Taliban should respond to a militarily superior power.

Beyond the battlefield, however, the Taliban regime faces a deeper crisis of legitimacy. The regime has attempted to invoke the rhetoric of jihadist nationalism to mobilise public sentiment, but it has struggled to galvanise widespread support among the Afghan population. This difficulty stems in part from the policies the Taliban pursued after returning to power following the withdrawal of American forces.

Rather than integrating Afghanistan’s diverse social and cultural traditions, the regime systematically dismantled many national symbols associated with Afghan identity, most visibly the beiragh, the national flag. Simultaneously, it attempted to construct a rigid ideological order and a new Afghan identity through strict social control laws that curtailed freedoms related to education, culture, and public life.

Now that the Taliban regime finds itself facing the pressure of a conventionally superior military force, it is attempting to reclaim the public support it once suppressed. Some elements within the second-tier leadership appear to believe that anti-Pakistan sentiment carefully cultivated during the previous governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani can be politically instrumentalised.

This calculation is reflected in the regime’s increasingly robust propaganda campaign across social media platforms. Through these narratives, the Taliban seeks to portray itself as the defender of Afghan sovereignty while depicting Pakistan as the aggressor, and also seeks greater political legitimacy.

Winning the battle of minds and hearts alongside the military contest will determine whether stability can emerge from a confrontation that otherwise risks deepening hostility between two neighbours that cannot escape each other’s geography

Winning the battle of minds and hearts alongside the military contest will determine whether stability can emerge from a confrontation that otherwise risks deepening hostility between two neighbours that cannot escape each other’s geography

Notably, these narratives often rely on selective ethnic framing, singling out “Punjab” as the locus of Pakistani power. This rhetorical strategy appears designed to dilute broader Islamic or Pashtun solidarities that might otherwise complicate the Taliban’s messaging and cause it to lose mass appeal. In effect, constructing a clear external enemy becomes essential for sustaining a moral narrative within a society where cultural symbols such as music, the arts, and education have been systematically suppressed.

Recent developments in various parts of Afghanistan suggest that this strategy has produced limited results. In the past few days, the regime attempted to organise public demonstrations to showcase domestic support but struggled to mobilise meaningful participation. The gap between the regime’s narrative and public sentiment has become increasingly visible. Equally telling is the silence of the Afghan diaspora. Despite its political vibrancy and global presence, Afghan communities across major world capitals have not organised significant protests, marches, or lobbying efforts in support of the Taliban regime.

For Pakistan, meanwhile, the challenge is as much perceptual as it is tactical. While it has achieved military successes targeting militant and military infrastructure, Islamabad finds itself walking a delicate tightrope. On one hand, it seeks to punish the Taliban regime for harbouring and enabling militant groups that threaten Pakistan’s security. On the other hand, it must avoid alienating the broader Afghan population, whose territory is now witnessing intense military action.

Recent policies, particularly the harsh treatment of Afghan refugees, risk sending an unintended message. Pakistan, after all, will remain geographically and historically intertwined with Afghanistan regardless of which regime holds power in Kabul. Managing the battle of perception, therefore, becomes critical. While the Taliban leadership may be the immediate adversary, the Afghan population should not become collateral damage in this strategic contest.

In this context, modern diplomacy alone may not suffice. Afghanistan’s social fabric is deeply shaped by traditional codes, tribal structures, and informal networks of influence. Engaging these cultural and social mechanisms may prove far more effective in shaping public perceptions. Pakistan would therefore benefit from deploying individuals who understand the intricate social dynamics of Afghan society within both its diplomatic and security institutions.

Ultimately, the conflict is being fought not only on the battlefield but also in the realms of perception and legitimacy. Winning the battle of minds and hearts alongside the military contest will determine whether stability can emerge from a confrontation that otherwise risks deepening hostility between two neighbours that cannot escape each other’s geography.

© The Friday Times