The “Atoms for Peace” policy, introduced by Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s, constituted a seminal initiative that fundamentally reoriented global perceptions of nuclear technology. It marked a transition from an exclusive emphasis on military destructiveness towards the promotion of civilian applications.

While the initiative successfully catalysed the development of nuclear medicine and civilian nuclear power industries, critics contend that it inadvertently facilitated the diffusion of sensitive technological knowledge and materials, thereby enabling several states to develop nuclear weapons and accelerating nuclear proliferation subsequently.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the policy directly contributed to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, an institution that continues to oversee nuclear activities and enforce safeguard mechanisms worldwide.

A significant number of nuclear weapons programmes have historically evolved under the guise of civilian nuclear initiatives, thereby rendering the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency increasingly critical in delineating the boundary between military ambitions and developmental objectives in nuclear technology.

In this context, recent remarks by Rafael Mariano Grossi merit closer scrutiny. He commended the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) located in Kalpakkam, India, acknowledging the “impressive progress” achieved in this advanced third-generation reactor.

During engagements at the World Economic Forum 2026 in Davos, Grossi further reiterated the Agency’s willingness to support India’s ambitious objective of expanding its nuclear capacity to 100 GW by 2047.

Given the increasingly blurred distinction between the militarisation and civilian utilisation of nuclear technology, all such initiatives must be subjected to comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

However, it is noteworthy that India has explicitly declined to place the PFBR under the IAEA’s safeguard regime. New Delhi has consistently resisted international inspection of its breeder programme, invoking “strategic interests”—a term widely interpreted as a reference to its nuclear weapons programme.

Since the PFBR operates outside the purview of IAEA safeguards, unlike India’s civilian Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), it remains unverified by the Agency. Consequently, there exists no independent mechanism to ensure that plutonium produced within the reactor is not diverted for military purposes.

India has historically maintained several nuclear reactors outside the IAEA’s monitoring framework. At present, eleven nuclear reactors remain unsafeguarded, with two additional units under construction

India has historically maintained several nuclear reactors outside the IAEA’s monitoring framework. At present, eleven nuclear reactors remain unsafeguarded, with two additional units under construction

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