Following the US-Israel attacks on Iran (which have been called illegal and also an act of aggression), hundreds of civilians are dead, including a dozen members of the civilian family of Iran’s Supreme Leader and schoolgirls. These attacks have led to a widespread discussion in legal parlance regarding the legality or illegality of these attacks and also the counterattacks launched by Iran against the Gulf States (Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait) with US military bases.

In this debate, some scholars are arguing that Iran’s attacks on the Gulf States are illegal because the Gulf states claim that their bases have not been used for the attacks in Iran, and Iran’s attacks against the Gulf states, as well as against Israel, are disproportionate.

There is widespread agreement on how the US-Israel attacks on Iran are inherently illegal, how the UK offering its air base to the US for collective self-defence is illegal, and how targeting civilians by either party is a violation of the principles of international humanitarian law and international law.

However, the core question remains to be answered: Does Iran’s attack on the Gulf States amount to a violation of international law? Let us approach this question from three angles: self-defence, the role of a third state, and state responsibility.

First of all, Iran has been attacked by the US and Israel, which is a flagrant violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibiting the use of force against the territorial sovereignty of a state. The conditions that normally justify the use of force do not apply in this situation.

Against these attacks, Iran has a lawful right to defend itself under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Defending includes neutralising the enemy by destroying its capability to attack, and it must be strictly limited to what is necessary to repel or prevent further armed attacks.

As for now, there does not exist any authentic confirmation that the US military bases in the Gulf States have not been used against Iran. Only the Gulf states’ assertion that they do not see themselves as complicit in the US-Israel attacks against Iran. But have these states condemned US-Israel strikes against Iran? Have they given an explicit public justification and assurance that the military bases in their territory have not been used by the attackers?

If military bases located in Gulf territory were operationally used to launch or directly support attacks against Iran, and if those states were aware of such use and could regulate or restrict it, then the legal situation becomes significantly more complicated than a simple claim of territorial violation

If military bases located in Gulf territory were operationally used to launch or directly support attacks against Iran, and if those states were aware of such use and could regulate or restrict it, then the legal situation becomes significantly more complicated than a simple claim of territorial violation

In this respect, it is pertinent to mention that some states even denied US access for offensive operations once the conflict began. For example, Spain explicitly refused permission to use its bases for attacks on Iran and publicly condemned the original US-Israeli strikes.

If we continue with assumptions, then, as per those assumptions, it is very unlikely that those bases were not used. But if we stick to confirmed facts, these questions hold some water. A host state’s public statement distancing itself from a conflict does not automatically settle questions of knowledge, consent, or operational involvement.

State responsibility is determined by conduct, not rhetoric. What matters is whether there was awareness, authorisation, or material facilitation, not merely whether a government issued a denial.

This brings us to the broader question of third-state responsibility. International law recognises that a state may incur responsibility if it knowingly allows its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of another state.

The International Court of Justice made this clear in the Corfu Channel case, affirming that states must not knowingly permit their territory to be used for harmful acts against others. The same idea appears in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and in Article 16 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, which addresses aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.

The legal threshold is not political alignment or silence; it is knowledge, capacity to prevent, and material contribution. If military bases located in Gulf territory were operationally used to launch or directly support attacks against Iran, and if those states were aware of such use and could regulate or restrict it, then the legal situation becomes significantly more complicated than a simple claim of territorial violation.

Responsibility would then have to be assessed under established principles of international law.

Some may attempt to rely on the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, arguing that if a host state cannot or will not prevent its territory from being used to launch attacks, another state may use force there in self-defence. However, this doctrine remains controversial and has never been clearly endorsed by the International Court of Justice.

More importantly, mere inability does not amount to aggression, nor does it automatically transform a state into a co-belligerent. Aggression and complicity require intentional or knowing involvement, not simple incapacity.

Therefore, the analysis depends on facts. If the bases targeted by Iran were directly connected to the armed attacks carried out against it, and if Iran’s response was limited to neutralising that specific capability within the limits of necessity and proportionality, then the legality of its actions cannot be dismissed outright.

If, however, the justification rests solely on a broad and unsubstantiated claim of inability, the legal foundation becomes far more fragile.

In the end, the decisive question is not whether Gulf States verbally distanced themselves from the conflict. It is whether there was operational linkage and whether the response remained confined to stopping further attacks rather than widening the war.

That factual determination is what ultimately shapes the legal conclusion.

© The Friday Times