Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia

The Real Key Moment for Taiwan Comes After the Trump-Xi Summit

Trump’s summit with Xi deferred the real Taiwan test: whether U.S. arms sales to Taipei will preserve credible support under strategic ambiguity, and how far Beijing will go to enforce its red line.

U.S. President Donald Trump bids farewell to China’s President Xi Jinping at Zhongnanhai in Beijing, China, May 15, 2026.

U.S. President Donald Trump recently concluded his two-day visit to Beijing, which he described as a “very successful” meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Regarding Taiwan, Trump largely stayed within Washington’s long-held position of strategic ambiguity. Unlike former President Joe Biden, Trump did not proactively emphasize U.S. interest in Taiwan Strait stability. Nor did he make clear promises to Xi about how he would deal with Taiwan. 

But the summit itself was not the decisive moment. The more consequential test will come afterwards, when Trump decides whether to proceed with $14 billion in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. That decision will reveal whether Washington’s strategic ambiguity still includes meaningful military support for Taipei, and whether Beijing is prepared to punish any deviation from the stability framework it tried to establish with Trump.

The Trump-Xi summit, as expected, did not end with Washington formally changing its declaratory policy to “opposing Taiwanese independence.” Beijing instead used the meeting to reinforce its red line: the stability of China-U.S. relations depends on Washington’s handling of Taiwan. 

Trump claimed he did not respond when Xi raised the issue of U.S. military support to Taiwan. Yet in another interview, he described U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a “very good negotiating chip.” Chinese state-backed media have also highlighted Trump’s comment about not wanting to see Taiwan “go independent” with U.S. backing, language echoing Beijing’s accusation of Taipei “relying on the U.S. for Taiwanese independence.”

Beijing has been carefully steering U.S.-China-Taiwan dynamics through leader-level diplomacy between China and the United States. Before the summit, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te visited Taiwan’s last ally in Africa, Eswatini, despite Beijing’s effort to derail Lai’s visit. Beijing condemned Lai as a “troublemaker,” but refrained from military reactions before Xi and Trump met. This restraint was notable. Since Lai became president, Beijing has launched four major military exercises around Taiwan, framing them as responses to Taiwanese separatism or foreign interference. Beijing has never wavered in punishing Taipei for Taiwanese diplomatic breakthroughs. This time, however, Beijing appeared careful not to give Washington a reason to focus the summit on Taiwan Strait instability.

Beijing instead focused on stability across the Pacific by introducing the phrase “constructive strategic stability” for ongoing China-U.S. relations. It implies a relationship in which Washington prioritizes great power stability and refrains from actions Beijing sees as encouraging Taiwanese separatism. Taiwan is therefore not characterized as one negotiable issue among many, but as a precondition for broader stability. 

Furthermore, Xi took the opportunity to imprint Beijing’s Taiwan narrative on Trump. Trump later claimed that, after a “whole night” conversation with Xi, he now knows more about Taiwan than he knows about “almost any country in the world.” Beijing’s perspective also seems to have registered with other senior American officials. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated that U.S. policies regarding Taiwan have not changed and that Washington would remain strategically ambiguous. Rubio also said that he understood the Chinese preference as achieving unification through Taiwan “willingly” and “voluntarily,” rather than by force. 

Beijing would consider such language as a small but positive shift. Compared to Biden’s repeated and clear statements of defending Taiwan and proactive emphasis on Taiwan Strait stability, China would certainly welcome the Trump administration’s return to ambiguity and focus on other issues than Taiwan.

For Washington, Beijing’s version of “constructive strategic stability” may fit the Trump administration’s current........

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