The Debate | Opinion | South Asia

Why the US Should Back Pakistan in Blacklisting BLA in the UNSC

The U.S. and Pakistan engage in substantial intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. These could be at risk.

Earlier this month, the United States, alongside France and the United Kingdom, blocked a joint China-Pakistan proposal at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to list the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and its Majeed Brigade as global terrorist entities.

Islamabad and Beijing had jointly submitted the resolution to blacklist the militant group under the UNSC’s 1267 Sanctions Committee. Pakistan had argued that both groups operate from sanctuaries in Afghanistan and threaten regional security. To justify the listing under the U.N.’s counter-terrorism architecture, Pakistan’s U.N. envoy, Asim Iftikhar, explicitly linked the BLA to global jihadist networks operating out of Afghanistan.

“Entities such as ISIL-K, al-Qaida, Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), East Turkistan Islamic Movement, BLA, and the Majeed Brigade are based in Afghan sanctuaries, with over 60 terrorist camps facilitating cross-border infiltration and assaults,” he pointed out.

However, three UNSC permanent members – the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom – invoked technical issues to point out that the committee specifically targets al-Qaida, Islamic State, and their affiliates. They claimed that localized militant groups do not automatically qualify under the 1267 Sanctions Committee’s mandate, irrespective of the severity of their actions or the threats they pose to regional stability.

Pakistan and China’s push to have these groups blacklisted by the UNSC is rooted in pressing counterterrorism priorities. China has made substantial investments in infrastructure and minerals in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province, and sees the militant threats posed by the BLA as a direct challenge to its Belt and Road ambitions. Islamabad, on its part, views the designation as essential to isolating the group diplomatically and financially worldwide, especially amid claims of external support for Baloch militants. In this context, a successful U.N. listing would have offered a multilateral framework to contain potential safe havens and disrupt transnational networks of both groups.

However, the blocking of the move, primarily by Washington, does not represent a straightforward setback for counterterrorism efforts against the BLA. It is not as if the U.S. does not perceive BLA to be a terrorist group.

Unilaterally, the U.S. has already applied robust domestic sanctions against the group. In July 2019, the U.S. State Department designated the BLA as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Then, in August 2025, the State Department upgraded its stance and added the Majeed Brigade as an “alias to BLA’s previous Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation.”

The State Department emphasized the significance of these steps. “Today’s action taken by the Department of State demonstrates the Trump Administration’s commitment to countering terrorism,” it noted in a statement last year. “Terrorist designations play a critical role in our fight against this scourge and are an effective way to curtail support for terrorist activities.”

Clearly, such designations subject the BLA and its affiliates to sanctions that restrict access to the U.S. financial system, among other measures. However, officials in Islamabad believe that more can be done to contain the BLA globally with the help of the U.S., and the blacklisting of the group at the UNSC is an important part of that effort.

While the U.S., French, and British objections rest on technicalities tied to the 1267 Committee’s scope at the UNSC, broader arguments exist for why Washington and its partners might have backed a global designation.

First, the support for the resolution can align the idea of........

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