Tokyo Report | Diplomacy | East Asia

Trump’s China Opening and Japan’s Taiwan Anxiety

Tokyo fears being sidelined again as Washington and Beijing recalibrate their relationship. Call it the “Trump Shock.”

U.S. President Donald Trump participates in a welcome ceremony with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, May 14, 2026.

The apparent closeness between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at their recent Beijing summit – along with Trump’s deferential posture toward Xi – sent shockwaves through Tokyo. This may one day be remembered in Japan as the “Trump Shock.”

For Japanese policymakers, the summit revived memories of the 1971 “Nixon Shock,” when Washington began the process of normalizing relations with Beijing and Japan learned of the rapprochement only after the fact. More than half a century later, Tokyo is once again anxiously watching the world’s two most powerful leaders redefine their relationship increasingly in G-2 terms – while Japan fears being sidelined once again.

The anxiety is especially acute for Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae.

No modern Japanese leader has adopted a more explicitly pro-Taiwan or hawkish China posture than Takaichi. Echoing the late Abe Shinzo’s famous formulation that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency,” she argued in the Diet last November that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” under Japan’s security legislation.

From Beijing’s perspective, such remarks crossed a political red line, as Taiwan is regarded by China as “the core of its core interests.”

Relations deteriorated sharply in the months that followed. Beijing imposed economic countermeasures – reducing flights, suspending seafood imports, and tightening rare earth export controls – while cooling political exchanges with Tokyo.

Yet through it all, Takaichi held firm. The broader assumption underpinning her position was that Washington would continue supporting Japan’s harder line on Taiwan.

That assumption now appears increasingly uncertain.

Before departing for Beijing, Trump publicly questioned whether Japan had become too forward-leaning on Taiwan.

“It’s a little bit of a difference. But, you know, there’s a lot of support for Taiwan, from Japan and from countries from that area,” Trump said at the White House on May 11, referring to Tokyo’s increasingly robust support for Taipei, including Takaichi’s own remarks regarding a Taiwan contingency. At the same time, he downplayed the likelihood of a cross-strait conflict.

In Tokyo, the comments were widely interpreted as a sign that Trump was growing uncomfortable with Takaichi’s harder Taiwan posture. That perception was reinforced by earlier reports that, during a phone call with Takaichi on November 25, 2025, Trump privately cautioned Japan against provoking China unnecessarily.

Ahead of the summit, Trump also stated that he intended to discuss future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Xi. He later acknowledged the issue had been discussed “in great detail” during the talks — immediately triggering concern in both Taipei and Tokyo.

Since 1982, the “Six Assurances” have underpinned Washington’s unofficial commitment to Taiwan, including a pledge not to consult Beijing in advance on arms sales to Taipei. Together with the Taiwan Relations Act, those assurances have underpinned decades of deterrence and strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait.

If Washington were to move even informally toward prior consultation with Beijing over Taiwan arms sales, many in Asia would interpret it as a significant shift in long-standing U.S. policy.

Following the summit, Trump held only a brief phone call with Takaichi during his return flight from Beijing. Although both governments publicly described the exchange positively, it did little to calm concerns inside Tokyo that Japan may not have been fully consulted regarding the substance of the summit talks. For many in Japan, the call appeared less........

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