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How China Got One of the World’s Largest Human Rights Convenings Canceled

RightsCon 2026 was supposed to be held in Zambia in May – but then Beijing pressured the host government. 

The closing day of RightsCon 2025, held in Taipei, Taiwan, Feb. 27, 2025.

On April 29, the shocking news broke that RightsCon 2026, one of the world’s largest human rights-related convenings, would be cancelled. On April 30, Access Now, the organizers of RightsCon, issued a statement saying that RightsCon would not take place either in-person or online. The news came less than a week before opening day and left over 3,000 participants scrambling to cancel their flights and accommodations.   

RightsCon is an annual gathering of primarily civil society and human rights advocates, joined by business leaders, policymakers, government representatives, technologists, academics, and journalists, on topics exploring the intersection of human rights and technology. In 2025, it was held in Taipei, Taiwan and before that in Costa Rica, Tunisia, Canada, and Belgium, as well as virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic. The May 5-8 gathering in Lusaka, Zambia was celebrated as a historic event, being the first time RightsCon would be held in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was also coming at a critical moment for the global human rights community, which has been under tremendous pressure due to funding cuts.

In a follow-up statement issued on May 1, Access Now provided disturbing details on the reason behind the RightsCon’s sudden cancellation: foreign interference from China. 

On April 27, one day after a government press release endorsed RightsCon, we received a phone call from [the Ministry of Technology and Science] MoTS about an urgent issue and were told that diplomats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were putting pressure on the Government of Zambia because Taiwanese civil society participants were planning to join us in person.

On April 27, one day after a government press release endorsed RightsCon, we received a phone call from [the Ministry of Technology and Science] MoTS about an urgent issue and were told that diplomats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were putting pressure on the Government of Zambia because Taiwanese civil society participants were planning to join us in person.

After multiple failed attempts to meet with their Zambian government contacts, Access Now was told informally from multiple sources that if they wanted RightsCon to continue, they would have to “moderate specific topics and exclude communities at risk, including our Taiwanese participants, from in-person and online participation.” Based on the lack of communication and good faith from the Zambian government and the conditions put forth, Access Now decided to cancel the conference.

Soon after this news broke, a number of organizations and publications came out with statements and analysis condemning the foreign interference that led to RightsCon’s cancellation. Still others, including Eric Olander of the China and Global South Project, argued that the charge of Chinese interference was a red herring with no supporting evidence. Citing the social media post of a Zambian scholar, Olander said the real culprit was the political situation in Zambia, which was becoming increasingly hostile to human rights. 

It seems highly unlikely that Access Now would rely on unsubstantiated information to accuse the Chinese government of interference. If the domestic political environment was the true reason, then why did that not come up as a red flag in Access Now’s careful vetting of Zambia as a location for RightsCon 2026? And why would Access Now have gotten approval from the Zambian government in the first place? 

It’s more likely there is truth to both explanations. In other words, Chinese diplomats did raise their concerns to Zambian government officials, and those officials were more likely to listen and not stand up for RightsCon given the domestic political environment.

If we go with this explanation, none of the above commentary answers the question of why the Chinese government would go to such lengths to pressure the Zambian government to put conditions on RightsCon 2026, how it was able to exert such pressure, and how future human rights convenings might deal with this precedent given China’s growing global influence. 

Access Now in their April 30 statement mentioned the participation of Taiwan CSOs as the main sticking point. This makes sense at a superficial level. Taiwan (formally the Republic of China) was expelled from the United Nations in 1971 and its seat was given to the People’s Republic of China, which is governed by the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP sees Taiwan as a renegade province that belongs to the PRC and has sought to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. Since the 1970s, so many countries have switched their diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC that the ROC now only enjoys diplomatic relations with 11 countries, mostly small Pacific and Caribbean island states. Taiwan is also barred from other international organizations such as the World Health Assembly and Interpol, although it is still a member of dozens of multilateral institutions. Due to pressure from the PRC government, Taiwanese citizens are also barred from U.N. venues and meetings. 

Taiwanese participants, however, are generally not excluded from non-governmental meetings. In fact, Taiwanese CSOs have participated in past RightsCon convenings as well as other international civil society meetings with no repercussions, and only a few Taiwanese CSOs were participating in sessions in RightsCon 2026. So why did the Chinese raise these concerns now? And how were they able to exert enough influence on the Zambian government to make these extraordinary last-minute demands on Access Now? These are important questions because without an informed understanding of the motives behind the Chinese government’s actions, Access Now and other civil society organizations run the risk of repeating history. 

I do not have inside information about the Chinese government’s motives, but what I can provide is a more informed understanding about their actions, relying on my years of experience working with civil society organizations in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and three trips to Africa over the last eight years. Two of those trips were to Zambia to interview dozens of local stakeholders and Chinese companies on the human rights impacts of their investments. 

Two observations stand out from my experiences that help to explain the cancellation of RightsCon 2026. The first is China’s sensitivity toward criticism of its human rights record, particularly as it impinges on their sovereignty and ability to operate in other countries. 

A close look at the RightsCon 2026 program suggests it was not only the presence of Taiwan participants but also the form their participation took that raised red flags for the Chinese government. In this case, Taiwanese CSOs were organizing sessions critical of China’s influence overseas, including Africa. Three sessions in particular fit this category: 1) Amnesty International’s Taiwan affiliate’s roundtable on “Confronting fear, exclusion and nationalism: how should civil society respond to China’s digital authoritarian practices;” 2) Open Culture Foundation’s dialogue on “Cybersecurity with Chinese characteristics, from exporting authoritarian norms to civil society resilience;” and 3) Doublethink Lab’s co-organized dialogue on “Networked authoritarianism: unpacking the China-Russia FIMI nexus in Ukraine, Taiwan, and Sub-Saharan Africa.” Doublethink Lab’s participation stands out among this group. In 2025 one of its founders was placed on a Chinese government list of “Taiwanese independence separatists” who would be investigated and put on trial in a Chinese court in absentia.  

Two other sessions were organized by a Uyghur group on confronting Uyghur forced labor in Chinese supply chains, a very sensitive topic in China, and a Hong Kong group on citizens setting digital rights standards. While the Uyghur and Hong Kong groups were not explicitly mentioned in Access Now’s statements, they do advocate for greater autonomy and even independence from China, which added to the sensitivity of their participation. Still other sessions organized by non-Taiwanese participants were devoted to Chinese surveillance in the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes Africa, and how China is exporting its Great Firewall to other countries. 

The second observation is that Zambia is one of the more vulnerable countries in a vulnerable........

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