Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

OPCON Transition: Now It Is Time for the Commanders-in-Chief

It’s time for the OPCON transition process to move beyond military assessments into the realm of political responsibility.

U.S. President Donald Trump is escorted by President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea at the Gyeongju National Museum, South Korea, Oct. 29, 2025.

The debate over wartime operational control (OPCON) transition once again stands at the threshold of decision. At the 57th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 2025, South Korea and the United States agreed to pursue verification of the full operational capability (FOC) of the Future Combined Forces Command headquarters in 2026, and the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) assessed that South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with “critical but more limited” U.S. support. 

More than 20 years have passed since the allies formalized OPCON transition, and more than a decade of preparation and verification has accumulated since they adopted the conditions-based transition plan. Meanwhile, South Korea has grown into an ally with military and economic capabilities entirely different from those it had when this arrangement was created some 70 years ago.

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The debate over wartime operational control (OPCON) transition once again stands at the threshold of decision. At the 57th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 2025, South Korea and the United States agreed to pursue verification of the full operational capability (FOC) of the Future Combined Forces Command headquarters in 2026, and the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) assessed that South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with “critical but more limited” U.S. support. 

More than 20 years have passed since the allies formalized OPCON transition, and more than a decade of preparation and verification has accumulated since they adopted the conditions-based transition plan. Meanwhile, South Korea has grown into an ally with military and economic capabilities entirely different from those it had when this arrangement was created some 70 years ago.

With the next SCM approaching, the question must change. Until now, the debate has centered on asking: have the military conditions been met? The purpose of a conditions-based approach was not to avoid a decision, but to make a responsible decision possible. Military preparation always carries residual risk, and from the moment one judges what level of risk is acceptable, the question moves beyond military assessment into the realm of political responsibility.

Whose Decision Is It?

The wartime OPCON exercised by the commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command derives from two sources. For U.S. forces, this authority is delegated through the chain of command from the U.S. president, through the secretary of defense, to the combatant commander. For South Korean forces, it is delegated under the South Korean president’s........

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